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EMPEROR CHARLES V AND SULTAN SÜLEYMAN I:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
By

SAMANTHA GOODRICH
B.A., History, University of New Mexico, 2011
M.A., History, University of New Mexico, 2017

ABSTRACT

This thesis is a comparative analysis of Emperor Charles V and Sultan Süleyman I.
Both men were archetypes of their age and perfectly demonstrated the perceived struggle
between the East and West, Christianity and Islam. These two were the first generation of
sovereigns of the early modern period, and throughout their time as monarchs each sought to
counteract and dominate the other by utilizing rhetoric, titulature, propaganda, regalia, and
iconography.
The texts and images used throughout serve as the best representatives of the Sultan’s
and Emperor’s theatrical conflict. The first chapter focuses on the evolution of the perception
of the Turk in the beginning of the sixteenth century. The second examines the relationship
between Charles, Süleyman, and their advisers while analyzing both ruler’s sovereign claims.
The final chapter analyzes the importance of religion in helping Charles and Süleyman exert
their power and authority, and their conflict with heretics.
Studying Charles V and Süleyman I in a comparative aspect is useful because both
rulers were excellent examples of the changes happening at the beginning of the early
modern period. These sovereigns reveal the aspirations and beliefs of their cultures, faiths,
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and nations, because on their perceived world stage they thought of themselves as ultimate
representatives in the struggle between the East and West. Although these two men, their
advisers, and subsequent scholars have emphasized differences, their interactions with one
another and their similarities are what is most striking in this study.
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Introduction
The early sixteenth century was vital in the formation of Europe and the Ottoman
Empire. For both regions, this was a time of technological, artistic, and intellectual
innovation as the spread of new ideals, inventions, and beliefs helped usher in the early
modern period. Although this century marked a significant shift from the Middle Ages, it was
also informed heavily by medieval traditions and reveals that the sixteenth century was a
mélange of modernization and transformation moderated by deeply embedded medieval
principles. The two individuals who best represent this period’s unique ideals and customs
are Holy Roman Emperor Charles V and Ottoman Sultan Süleyman. Both men were
archetypes of their age and perfectly demonstrated the perceived struggle between the East
and the West, Christianity and Islam. Charles and Süleyman were the first generation of
sovereigns of the early modern period, and throughout their time as monarchs each sought to
counteract and dominate the other.
During the early modern period, the Europeans and Ottomans built up an ideology
and rhetoric perpetuating the dichotomy between the East and West and Muslims and
Christians. Ever since the Crusades, the Europeans expressed their negative perception of the
Turks, and by the time Mehmed II conquered Constantinople in 1453 the Ottomans became
the permanent Turkish threat. By the sixteenth century, especially due to the Renaissance,
European writers referred to and portrayed the Ottomans as barbarians and enemies of the
faith. This perception continued into the modern period, as the divide between the barbaric
East and civilized West was further emphasized by Western historians of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. Only within the past few decades have scholars started to negate this
artificial separation between Europe and the Middle East.
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Despite the numerous differences between Charles and Süleyman as rulers, their
similarities are striking and of relevance in helping break down the hard line between the
East and West. While they and their propagandists tended to highlight their various
dissimilarities, the Emperor and Sultan tended to mirror each other, especially in their youth,
with their aspirations, claims, rhetoric, iconography, and ideology. During the first half of
both men’s reigns, they were under the influence of their advisers who believed that both
monarchs were destined for universal sovereignty based on prophecies that circulated
throughout Christendom and the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, Charles and Süleyman utilized
similar tactics to express their dominion and successes over the other. It was Süleyman,
however, who was the most powerful and successful sovereign in Europe and the Middle
East due to the makeup of the Ottoman government and its relationship with Islam.
The traditional narrative of the Ottoman Empire presented the sixteenth century,
specifically Süleyman’s reign, as a “Golden Age,” and the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries as eras of decline. According to historian Suraiya Faroqhi, during Süleyman’s rule
and then immediately after contemporary Ottoman writers portrayed his sultanate as a golden
period, and lamented that they lived in a time of decline. She argues that subsequent
historians have taken these sources at face value, and based off of these texts they have
promulgated this narrative. 1 Although the power and authority of the sultan did deteriorate
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this does not mean that the actual empire
was in decline. Süleyman’s sultanate was indeed a highpoint for the absolute authority of the
sultans, but also marks the beginning of the increase in the influence of advisers and grand
viziers, which led to the deterioration of the sultan’s power in the following centuries.
1

Suraiya Faroqhi, Subjects of the Sultan: Culture and Daily Life in the Ottoman Empire (London: I.B.
Tauris, 2000), 75-76.
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Charles presents a problem of interpretation for historians, because he is an elusive
and multifaceted character much like the territories that he ruled over, and can be presented
in a variety of ways. Due to Charles inheriting incredibly diverse kingdoms like the
Netherlands and Spain and his election to the position of Holy Roman Emperor in the
Germanies, his legacy varies from place to place. The year 2000 witnessed the 500 year
anniversary of the birth of Charles. To commemorate this occasion the cities of Toledo,
Bonn, Vienna, and Ghent cooperated in staging a quincentenary exhibition including
festivals, displays of art, conferences, and various publications. C. Scott Dixon mentions in
his article “Charles V and the Historians: Some Recent German Works on the Emperor and
His Reign” that initially the basic idea was to “recreate a general sense of the massive
multinational imperium:” however, this aim proved impossible due to “local flavour, national
identities and the fortunes of history.” Therefore spectators encountered four separate images
of Charles’s character and reign based on the different territories. Despite Charles posing
somewhat of an interpretational problem for scholars today, he is a perfect representation and
product of his time and studying him in a comparative relationship with Süleyman helps
break down the artificial divide between the East and West.
Texts and images that reflected Süleyman’s and Charles’s aspirations and assertions
through rhetoric, titulature, ideology, iconography, and imagery served as the main criteria in
choosing primary sources. Since these two men never actually came into contact, they tended
to interact through propaganda and large displays of grandeur and power. Therefore, the
quotes and images utilized throughout serve as the best representatives of the Sultan’s and
Emperor’s theatrical conflict. The first chapter tracts ideas of men from men like Luther,
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Guicciardini, and Ibn Zunbul that reveal the general opinions of Europeans and Muslims, but
also reflect the intellectual atmosphere at the beginning of the sixteenth century.
Studying Charles V and Süleyman I in a comparative aspect is useful because both
rulers were excellent examples of the changes happening at the beginning of the early
modern period. These sovereigns reveal the aspirations and beliefs of their cultures, faiths,
and nations, and on their perceived world stage they thought of themselves as ultimate
representatives in the struggle between the East and West. While these two men, their
advisers, and subsequent scholars have emphasized differences, their interactions with one
another and their similarities are what is most striking in this study. Comparison helps break
down the artificial divide that has been perpetuated for centuries between western Europeans
and the Ottoman Turks.
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Chapter 1: The Evolution of the Perception of the Turk in the Early Sixteenth Century
Towards the end of the fifteenth century the Ottomans emerged as a major force on
the European political stage, and by the sixteenth century they became the embodiment of
Islamdom and the foe of Christendom. 2 While the fifteenth century was vital in helping
establish the Ottomans as an empire and legitimate threat to the east and west, it was the
beginning decades of the sixteenth century that witnessed the true blossoming of Ottoman
power and influence. Before Süleyman helped the empire to grow to its largest size, his
father’s brief eight-year reign turned the Ottoman Empire from a marginal Muslim state into
the central power of the Islamic world. It was Selim’s military victories against the rival
Safavid Shi’a in Iran and the Mamluks of Egypt that enabled Süleyman to act as the defender
of Islam against her foes, especially the infidel Christians. Even though Selim and his father
Bayezid II did not direct much of their attention toward Latin Christendom during their
reigns, the discussion of the Turk was a significant topic for western Europeans.
Mehmed II (r. 1444-46 and 1451-81) and the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 was
not only a turning point for the Ottoman Empire, but also for western Europe, since this
triumph helped establish the Ottomans as the permanent Muslim enemy in the minds of
Christians. The following century was the first to witness a real concern over the Turkish
advance among Europeans, and this continued into the early modern period. However, even
though the West considered Mehmed to be a menace and enemy of the faith, he and his
successors were also able to successfully establish relationships, and even alliances, with
European nations like Venice and France.

2

Norman Housley, The Later Crusades, 1274-1580: From Lyons to Alcazar (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1992), 119; Norman Housley, Religious Warfare in Europe, 1400-1536 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002), 131.
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Although there was interaction between the Ottomans and the Europeans since the
end of the fourteenth century, Mehmed’s reign marked an increase in European artistic
patronage and cultural interaction between the two. The art produced in the Italian peninsula
in the mid-fifteenth century greatly intrigued the sultan, and by the end of the 1470s he
concentrated his growing patronage on Florence and Venice. 3 In 1479, Mehmed sent an
envoy to Venice to request the services of an artist talented in portraiture, and the Venetian
government sent Gentile Bellini (c.1429-1507). 4 Throughout Bellini’s stay in Istanbul he
produced a variety of artwork including a stunning portrait of the sultan (Fig. 1), and a
beautiful image of a member of the Ottoman court serving as a scribe (Fig. 2). While Bellini
was not the only European under Mehmed’s commission in Istanbul between 1460 and 1480,
his artwork is a wonderful representation of the cultural and artistic interaction that existed
between western Europe and the Ottoman Empire. Even though the relationship between the
Ottomans and European-Christians was often predicated on war, it was also characterized by
diplomacy and artistic exchange.

3

Elizabeth Rodini, “The Sultan’s Truce Face? Gentile Bellini, Mehmet II, and the Values of
Verisimilitude,” in The Turk and Islam in the Western Eye, 1450-1750: Visual Imagery before Orientalism, ed.
James G. Harper (England: Ashgate, 2011), 24-25.
4
Ibid., 24.
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Figure 1. Gentile Bellini, The Sultan Mehmet II, 1480. Oil on canvas, 69.9 x 52.1 cm. The National Gallery,
London (NG3099). From: The British Museum Online, https://www.nationalgallery.org.uk/paintings/gentilebellini-the-sultan-mehmet-ii (accessed June 06, 2017).

Sultan Mehmed II invited Venetian artist, Gentile Bellini, to Constantinople in order to paint
portraits of the Ottoman court.

8

Figure 2. Gentile Bellini, Seated Scribe, 1480. Pen in brown ink with watercolor and gold on paper,
18.2 x 14 x 2.6 cm (7 3/16 x 5 1/2 x 1 in.) Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum, Boston (P15e8). From:
The Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum Online,
http://www.gardnermuseum.org/collection/browse?filter=artist:3157 (accessed June 06, 2017).

A beautiful image of a seated scribe attributed to Gentile Bellini during his stay in
Constantinople under Sultan Mehmed II.
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Bayezid II (r. 1481-1512) served as the sultan during the beginning decades of the
sixteenth century, and unlike his predecessor and immediate successors he was not renowned
for his military prowess. Although Bayezid engaged in numerous battles against the
Venetians, and even defeated them in 1503 acquiring ports in Morea, including Lepanto, he
left eastern Europe largely alone and was therefore not perceived as a true peril to the safety
of Latin Christendom. 5 However, his son, Selim I (r.1512-20), was an able ruler and military
commander and his rapid successes in the east were a cause for alarm among the papacy and
European rulers. Florentine historian and statesman Francesco Guicciardini’s The History of
Italy gives perfect insight into the differing views on the two sultans. Guicciardini (14831540), a contemporary and friend of Machiavelli, was a former servant of the Florentine
Republic and a principal writer of the sixteenth century. 6
From 1537 until his death on May 22, 1540 he wrote The History which is an Italian
narrative that blamed foreigners like the kings of France and Spain for Italy’s troubles after
the French invasion of 1494. 7 The text begins with a brief account of 1490 to 1493, and for
Guicciardini 1494 was “a most unhappy year for Italy, and in truth the beginning of those
years of misfortune, because it opened the door to innumerable calamities, in which, one
could say, for various reasons, a great part of the world was subsequently involved.” 8 While
this claim is a slight exaggeration, from the European perspective it did appear as though the
main political players on the world stage were involved in the affairs of Italy. The French, the
Spanish under Ferdinand of Aragon, The Hapsburg Holy Roman Emperor, and the Ottomans
5

L.W. Cowie, Sixteenth-Century Europe (Great Britain: Oliver & Boyd, 1977), 289.
Thomas J. Dandelet, The Renaissance of Empire in Early Modern Europe (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2014), 74.
7
Ibid.
8
Francesco Guicciardini, The History of Italy, trans. Sidney Alexander (New York: Macmillan, 1968),
32.
6
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were all involved in some way with Italy during the beginning of the early modern period.
Even though the Ottomans made advances against the Venetians in 1503, they were probably
the least destructive to the security of the Italian peninsula. Though Guicciardini’s tone is
generally negative in regards to the Ottoman Turks, his opinion on foreign monarchs like the
French kings and the Hapsburg Emperors is just as disapproving due to their constant
meddling in Italian affairs.
Guicciardini did not dedicate many pages to the discussion of the Ottomans, but his
accounts of sultans Bayezid, Selim, and Süleyman are indicative of the changing perception
of the danger that the Ottomans posed to the Europeans. He only mentioned Bayezid a few
times in relation to the Ottoman involvement with the Venetians, and even though the sultan
was successful at the expense of Venice, Guicciardini’s overall assessment of the Turkish
ruler is positive. The author recounted the peace arrangements between the Ottomans and the
Venetians in his account of the year 1504. Guicciardini referred to Bayezid in his entries for
1494 and 1499, but these are brief references that do not indicate any sort of feeling towards
the sultan or the Ottomans. In 1504, Bayezid proved to no longer be a threat to the Italian
peninsula and Europe, and Guicciardini’s description of the ruler reflects this. He began by
noting that both the Ottomans and Venetians “greedily grasped” for peace and attributed this
to Bayezid being:
… a prince of mild ways, very unlike his ferocious father, and dedicated to literature
and to the study of the sacred books of his religion, was by nature very indisposed to
warfare. Therefore, although he had begun the war with the greatest preparations by
land and by sea, and in the first two years had captured Naupactus, (today called
Lepanto), Modon, Corone and Giunco, in the Morea, nevertheless he had not
subsequently followed through the war with the same intensity. 9

9

Ibid., 176.
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Not only did Guicciardini note that Bayezid was unlike his father who expanded the Ottoman
Empire at the expense of the Christians, but he also portrayed the sultan as an enlightened
ruler who was interested in scholarly pursuits and religion. For Guicciardini, it was the
European monarchs who ravaged Italy for their own purposes that were responsible for the
ailments of the Venetians and the entire Italian peninsula. After his summary of the
relationship between the Venetians and the Turks he declared that:
The war against the Turks did not create as much harm to the Venetians as did the
fact that the King of Portugal had taken away the spice trade from them, to their great
detriment and damage…And since this was one of the most memorable things which
happened in the world for many centuries, and since the harm it caused the city of
Venice has some connection with Italian affairs, it is not entirely irrelevant to discuss
it at some length. 10
Sultan Bayezid may not have been a cause of alarm for Guicciardini and other
Europeans, but his son and successor Selim’s rapid conquests in the east resulted in alarm
especially for the Pope and the French, Spanish, English, and Hapsburg monarchs. It was
Selim’s victories against the Safavid Shah Isma’il of Persia (r. 1501-24) in 1514, and the
Mamluks in Egypt and Syria two years later that paved the way for Süleyman’s military
successes during his sultanate. Süleyman (r.1520-66) was also able to represent the Ottomans
for the first time as the true defenders of Islam on the world stage against Christendom due to
Selim’s acquisition of the Muslim holy cities, Mecca and Medina. By conquering the
Mamluk Empire, Selim became the first Ottoman to take the title of caliph and began to
actively promote himself as the universal Islamic ruler whose sovereignty reached beyond his
borders. 11 Selim turned the Ottoman Empire from a marginal Muslim state into the central
power of the Islamic world, while also drawing the attention of the Europeans.

10
11

Ibid., 179.
Giancarlo Casale, The Ottoman Age of Exploration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 30-31.
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Selim was not Bayezid’s oldest son, and so he secured his position as ruler in the
normal Ottoman fashion by eliminating his brothers and nephews, and even deposed his
father in 1512. When Guicciardini reflected on Selim’s murderous nature in The History he
claimed that “it was also universally believed that in order to be completely safe, Selim had
had him [Bayezid] wickedly put to death by poison.” 12 He went so far as to speculate that
Selim was not “content with having killed, according to Ottoman custom, his nephews and
any other descendants of that stock, it was believed (so bitter and implacable was his
temperament) that he sometimes thought of taking the life of his only son Suleiman.” 13
While it is highly unlikely that Selim actually wanted to assassinate his only successor, this
quote demonstrates that the Europeans were alarmed by the new sultan’s fratricide and
believed his bouts of violence would result in the Ottomans turning their attention back to
Europe. Selim’s takeover of the sultanate and defeat of the Safavids and Mamluks happened
within five years, and Christian Europe firmly believed that he would turn his Ottoman army
against them. By 1518 there was a respite in war throughout Italy which had not happened
for years:
On the contrary, all the Christian princes seemed to be of the same disposition; and
among these, the Pope being the promulgator thereof, plans were being made (with
more seeming argumentation rather than substantial recommendations) for a unified
expedition of all Christendom against Selim, Prince of the Turks. Selim’s power had
so grown the previous year that, considering his might and his greed for domination,
his skill and ferocity, it might well be suspected that if the Christian powers did not
take steps to attack him, he would turn his victorious arms against them before much
time passed. 14
Even more significant for Guicciardini and Italy was that there were rumors that
“Selim’s thoughts were entirely turned toward Italy, and that his idea of attacking it was
12

Guicciardini, The History, 298.
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
13

13
emboldened by the disagreement amongst the princes and his knowledge of how much Italy
had been lacerated by many years of war.” 15 Due to this assessment, with the ascension of
Pope Leo X (r. 1513-21) in 1513 there was actual hope for a European crusade against the
Turk. Leo became Pope on March 9, 1513 and by September of that year he issued crusade
indulgences against the Turks and again in November of 1517. 16 News of Selim’s victory
against Shah Isma’il of Persia at Chaldiran in August 1514 reached Rome on October 30,
1514 and caused alarm for the Pope. 17 Leo headed the Fifth Lateran Council (1512-17)
where there were several appeals to heed the Eastern danger. On May 4, 1515, the titular
archbishop of Patras, Stefano Taleazzi, cautioned that the Turk “like a ferocious dragon
moves swiftly forward to devour us.” 18 Therefore, Leo helped establish a “universal truce for
five years amongst all the Christian potentates” and “everyone accepted the truce, and
everyone declared himself, with ostentatious and magnificent speeches, to be against the
Turk and to be ready (if the others concurred) to lend all their strength to so just a cause.” 19
Since Selim did not turn his attention toward Europe, the crusade against the Turks never
came to fruition because the rulers of Europe “considered the danger uncertain and very far
off” and the:
…. result was that all these negotiations not only did not lead to any hopeful
conclusion, but were also dealt with only frivolously and, as it were, ceremoniously.
Furthermore, it is natural among mankind that those things which at first seem most
terrifying, diminish and cancel themselves out from day to day, so that unless new
occurrences supervene to rekindle the terror, in the space of a very short time men
convince themselves that they are practically out of danger. 20
15

Ibid., 300.
Housley, The Later Crusades, 125.
17
T.C. Price Zimmerman, Paolo Giovio: The Historian and the Crisis of Sixteenth-Century Italy
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 25.
18
Ibid., 26.
19
Guicciardini, The History, 301.
20
Ibid., 301-302.
16

14
The diarist and historian, Marin Sanudo (1466-1536), offers the Venetian perception
of the Ottomans and Selim in his fifty-eight volume diary that he kept from 1496 to 1533. It
consists of 40,000 pages, and includes official documents, private letters, and first-hand
accounts of events. Before he died, he bestowed the manuscript notebook of the diaries to the
Venetian government for their use and preservation. 21 After Selim deposed his father and
took the throne, the Venetians renewed their truce with the Turks on October 17, 1513, and
both sides agreed not to interfere in the wars of the other as long as attacks were not directed
at them. 22 Sanudo’s diary entry for July 30, 1517 gives insight into why the Christians feared
Selim’s conquest of the Mamluks, as he commented on the slaughter of “mamluks and
golems” and noted that “at present, the Turkish sultan has begun to destroy the Arabs with
great cruelty, even little children.” 23 In the same entry, Sanudo also included a letter that the
captain of the Turkish armada wrote to the Grand Master of the Knight of Rhodes:
“….Now the sword of the Moslems has been delivered into the hands of the lord
sultan Selim, lord of the world…but you, you mangy herd dog…if you act against
this commandment [to recognize the lordship of the sultan]…if you think that fear
will keep us from coming to your herd of pigs and taking it, this devilish thought will
bring great harm upon your head….” 24
Despite the torrid relations between the Ottomans and Europe, the Venetians had a decent
rapport with the Turkish sultan. For the entry of May 16, 1518, Sanudo included a letter from
Selim in which he talked about the “love and good peace and friendship that will always exist
between us [the Ottomans and Venice]”:

21

Marin Sanudo, Venice, Cità Excelentissima: Selections from the Renaissance Diaries of Marin
Sanudo, ed. Patricia H. Labalme and Laura Sanguineti White (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
2008), xix.
22
Ibid., 178.
23
Ibid., 206.
24
Ibid.
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Sultan Selim sach, son of Sultan Bajesit Chan the Emperor of Emperors (Imperator
Imperatorum), Emperor by the grace of God, Greatest Emperor of Asia, Europe,
Persia, Syria, unconquered Lord of Arabia and Egypt, etc.
Hitherto there was always an oath of good friendship and peace between the
Most Serene Doge of Venice and us, and at present the aforesaid Most Serene Doge
of Venice, ser Leonardo Loredan, has sent ser Bortolo Contarini and ser Alvise
Mocenigo the knight, his worthy gentleman, to my high and glorious court to show
the love and royal friendship and ancient peace that existed between us, and to affirm
it and work together to improve it. And I swear by God who created heaven and
earth…that love and good peace and friendship will always exist between us…. 25
Selim’s letter to the Doge was sincere, and the Venetians and the Ottomans continued their
peaceful associations into Süleyman’s reign.
While Selim was a very real and dangerous hazard to the Muslim states in the Middle
East, he was not an actual menace to western Europe as his son Süleyman would prove to be.
There is an obvious shift in tone toward the Ottoman Turk after Süleyman conquered
Belgrade in 1521 and Rhodes in 1522. The topic of the Turk was also important to northern
European writers like reformer Martin Luther (1483-1546) and humanist Desiderius Erasmus
(1466-1536), due to the Ottomans involvement in eastern and central Europe. Luther referred
to the Turks abundantly throughout his texts, and even devoted three tracts to the topic,
however these writings appear after Süleyman directed his attention toward Europe in 1521.
The first time Luther actually referred to the Turks was in The Nintey-Five Theses in 1517,
and is one of the forty-one that were condemned by the Papal Bull, Exsurge Domine, in 1520
as heretical and scandalous. Luther believed that the Turks were a punishment from God for
Christian sins, especially the papacy, and proclaimed that to fight the Turks was to resist the
judgement of God (“Proeliari adversus Turcas est repugnare Deo visitanti iniquitates

25

Ibid.
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nostras per illos.”) In the same year, Luther maintained this position in his Latin reply to the
Bull of Excommunication and in the German version published in 1521. 26
Before Luther’s Theses, Erasmus dedicated The Education of a Christian Prince,
published in May 1516, to the future Emperor Charles V (r. 1519-56). In this year the
Ottoman sultan was thoroughly involved in the east, and therefore the Turk was not a direct
threat to Europe. Prior to Luther’s call for religious reform and avoidance of war with the
Turk, Erasmus urged Prince Charles that he did not believe:
…. that war against the Turks should be hastily undertaken, remembering first of all
that the kingdom of Christ was created, spread, and secured by very different
means….Indeed, judging by the people who fight this kind of war nowadays, it is
more likely that we shall turn into Turks than that our efforts will make them into
Christians. Let us first make sure that we are truly Christian ourselves and then, if it
seems appropriate let us attack the Turks. 27
During the beginning decades of the sixteenth century for men like Erasmus and Luther,
Christian reform was more important than an offense against the Ottomans. In 1517 Erasmus
reiterated his desire for reform and peace amongst the warring European monarchs in his
plea, A Complaint of Peace. Erasmus is similar to Guicciardini in his disproval of the internal
fighting between the European princes, and even asked “what land has not been soaked in
Christian blood, what river or sea not stained with human gore?” 28 During this time, for
Europeans in the north and the south, the warring Christian monarchs were more of a cause
for worry than the Muslim Turks.

26

Dorothy M. Vaughan, Europe and the Turk: A Pattern of Alliances, 1350-1700 (New York: AMS
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In 1518 in a letter to Paul Volz, Erasmus criticized the crusade ideal by exposing the
harshness of prevailing attitudes toward the Turk, and implored what would become of the
Turks if Leo X’s proposed crusade succeeded. He discussed the Turks from a Christian
humanist standpoint and challenged contemporary European notions of holy war and the
Infidel. 29 In his letter he noted that “if the Turks should observe our ambition because of our
loud, tyrannical clamoring, our avarice because of our plundering, our lust because of our
debauchery, our cruelty because of our oppressive rule, how shall we press upon them the
doctrine of Christ, so contrary to all these things?” 30 Like Luther, Erasmus argued that the
Christians were a greater danger to their faith than the Turks, and even referred to them as
“men, nor are their hearts of iron or steel.” 31 However, by 1529 after Süleyman’s first siege
of Vienna, both Luther and Erasmus changed their tunes in regard to the Ottoman Turks. The
reason for this change is that Süleyman posed an actual threat to Europe in the Mediterranean
and in eastern Europe, while Selim never had the time, and possibly even the ambition, to
invade Europe. It was Süleyman who awakened the true fears of Turks in Europe.
Even though Europeans feared the Turk, and often wrote derogatorily about the
Ottomans, several scholars and travelers writing in the early modern period commended
them for various reasons while still referring to them as barbarians. Italian historians and
treatise writers Giovanni Menavino, Andrea Cambini, and Paolo Giovio echoed humanist
concepts of the Turks as a menace to both Christianity and high culture, while also praising
aspects of their empire. 32 Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) is another important Italian writer
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from the early sixteenth century that gives insight into the European perception of the Turk.
Machiavelli saw the Ottomans as a great and impressive empire, and like Guicciardini, he
believed that the European monarchs were the reason for Italy’s problems. In book four of
The Prince (1513) Machiavelli compared the Ottoman Empire to France, since the latter was
a cause for strife in Italy, his assessment is much more negative than that of the Turks. 33 For
Machiavelli, the barbarians were the French who unleashed their “barbarous cruelties and
outrages” upon Italy. 34 His praise of the Turks reaches its pinnacle in The Discourses on Livy
(1513-17) in the preface to book two. He contended that the world’s virtu, which had been
centered in Rome for centuries, had been redistributed to other nations including the Turks. 35
He believed that “whoever is born in Italy or Greece and has not become either an
Ultramontane in Italy or a Turk in Greece has reason to condemn his times and to praise
others, since in the latter there are plenty of things to evoke his admiration, whereas in the
former he comes across nothing but extreme misery, infamy, and contempt…” 36 Despite the
general negative view of the Turk throughout European literature in the beginning of the
century, Machiavelli is a perfect example of the dual outlook that Europeans had in regard to
the Turks. While the Ottomans posed a threat to the safety of Latin Christendom, they also
had redeemable qualities which were a topic of discussion for early modern Europeans.
There are not many Ottoman sources available outside of Ottoman Turkish and
modern Turkish from the beginning decades of the sixteenth century that reveal the Ottoman
perception of the West. There is also no body of evidence on the Ottoman response to the

33

Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. George Bull (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 15-18.
Ibid., 82.
35
Bisaha, Creating East and West, 177.
36
Niccolo Machiavelli, The Discourses, ed. Bernard Crick (London: Penguin Books, 1970), 267.
34

19
discovery of the Americas. 37 However, there is a map by Ottoman galley captain, Piri Reis
(c. 1465/70-1553), from 1513 which reveals that the Ottomans had interest in and were aware
of the European discoveries in the Atlantic (Fig. 3). Reis was the Ottoman’s first noteworthy
cartographer who made some use of Western sources, and in turn he introduced the Ottomans
to the new discoveries in the Atlantic. 38 This is an improved copy of Columbus’s map from
1498, and is the oldest surviving map of the Americas. 39 It was drawn in color on gazelle
parchment hide, and depicts the western portion of the world while the remainder has been
lost. 40 In 1517, Piri Reis dedicated his map to Sultan Selim who encouraged him to undertake
his book, Kitab-ı Bahriye (Book of Sea Lore), which was a study of the naval conditions of
the Mediterranean and was completed in 1521. In 1526, Reis expanded the book by adding a
long introductory poem that gave the Ottoman elite their first detailed account of the
European discoveries. The bulk of the Bahriye is an elaborate guide for the Mediterranean
sailor and does not necessarily deal with the European discoveries, but a portion of the
introductory poem does.
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The poem is written in relatively simple Ottoman Turkish and is divided into twentythree sections. The first eight contain a history of the manuscript, account of nautical
problems, introduction to the use of compasses and maps, and descriptions of the world’s
seas. The last fifteen chapters are important because they recount the history of the fifteenth
and sixteenth century European explorations. 41 While Selim was not involved in Europe
during his reign, the Europeans, especially the Portuguese, turned their attention toward the
Indian Ocean, and their action in this region restricted access to Mecca and Medina for the
first time in history. 42 In his introductory poem, Reis commented on how the Portuguese
intruded deep into Muslim territories, and how in 1517 they raided Jidda, the port for Mecca
and Medina, and lamented that the Christian penetration into the house of Islam was a matter
of shame for the Muslims. Although the Ottomans were relative newcomers in the Indian
Ocean, Selim’s conquest of the Mamluks by 1517 made him the “Protector of the Holy
Cities” and defender of all Islamdom, and this solidified the Ottomans as the most powerful
Muslim state. 43
Within eight short years, Selim transformed the empire by doubling its size and by
making the Ottoman sultan the new leader of the Muslim world. Selim and his army were
formidable foes for the fledgling Safavids in Iran and the declining Mamluks in Egypt. The
Safavid Empire began as a Turkmen confederation in opposition to the centralized power of
the Ottomans led by a Shi’a Sufi sheikh, and they dominated all of Iran by 1510. Two years
after deposing his father, Selim crushed the rebel Turks in Anatolia and proceeded to take on
the Safavids and their supposedly infallible leader, Shah Isma’il. On August 23, 1514 Selim
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defeated Isma’il at the Battle of Chaldiran, which helped secure eastern Anatolia and lessen
the severity of the Safavid threat to the Ottoman Empire. 44 Even though the Safavids
continued to pose problems for the Ottomans during Süleyman’s reign, their overall hazard
was diminished and enabled Selim to conquer the Mamluks. Acquisition of the holy cities
strengthened the Ottoman claim to be protector of Sunni orthodoxy against the Shi’a
heterodoxy of Isma’il.
Selim’s victory against the Mamluk Empire was a major turning point for the
Ottomans, because now the sultan was the “sovereign chosen by God to protect the whole
[true] Islamic world.” 45 Since the late thirteenth century on, the Ottoman tribal chieftains and
sultans emphasized their role as gazi warriors engaged in Holy War, and the acquisition of
Mecca and Medina meant that Selim, and his successors, could legitimately portray
themselves as the defenders of the faith. However, even though the Ottomans were now in
control of the Holy Cities and declared themselves to be the protectors of Islam, they were
not entirely welcome. After the Ottomans took control of Egypt, the Egyptian historian Ibn
Zunbul wrote his account of the defeat in the Wáqciat as-Sultán Selim Khán Maca s-Sultán
Túmánbáy. Little is known about Ibn Zunbul, but the astronomer to the Mamluk Sultan alGhuri (r. 1501-16) probably died sometime after 1553. This book is a mixture of “high” and
folk literature, historiography, and takes the form of a semi-folk epic. 46 The text is clearly a
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pro-Mamluk work, written when Egypt was already in Ottoman possession, and reflects the
general opinion of the Egyptian people and their admiration for the Mamluks. 47
Overall this text is an apology for the Mamluks, and while the author presented them
as good Muslims he proclaimed that the Ottomans were originally Christians who converted
to Islam, thus undermining their claim as defenders of the Muslim faith. Even though the
characters of the book are traditionally illustrated as good or evil, and Selim is assigned the
role of enemy and conqueror, he is not a completely bad character. Per the text, Selim did not
want to go to Egypt but was persuaded by the greedy Mamluk emir Khayrbay, the governor
of Syrian Aleppo, who wanted to share in the spoils of Egypt. Ibn Zunbul thus relieved Selim
of responsibility for the Egyptian campaign, even though the Ottoman sultan was far more
interested in wealthy Cairo than in arid Syria. Throughout, Ibn Zunbul depicted Selim as a
ruler who was easily influenced and likely to listen to other’s advice. For Zunbul the
Ottoman’s victory was effortless and accidental, due to corruption and plotting within the
Mamluk army, and characters like emir Khayrbay were the true villains of his narrative. 48
Most importantly, Zunbul emphasized the belief that the Ottomans used unfair weapons, and
had they not the Mamluks would have beaten them with classical weapons. 49
According to Zunbul, the Ottomans were dependent on Western technology and to an
increasing extent relied on Western renegades and mercenaries to equip and direct their
artillery. 50 His opinion of the conquest is evident in two imaginary conversations between
Selim and Sultan Tumanbay II of Cairo (r. 1516-17) and another Mamluk emir named
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Kurtbay. In the dialogue between Selim and Tumanbay, the latter accused his enemy of
committing an unforgivable crime by using firearms against Muslims, and asserted that the
Mamluks fought like lions, in accordance with the Divine Law, with weapons that were
approved by the prophet Muhammad. Here Selim is portrayed as a cruel conqueror, but one
who was put in the position by men like Khayrbay. In this scene, Selim even apologized for
causing conflict and defended himself by saying that he received the fatwa from the ulama
permitting him to enter Egypt. 51 This sentiment is reiterated in a conversation between Selim
and the captured emir Kurtbay:
You have patched up an army from all parts of the world: Christians, Greeks, and
others, and you have brought with you this contrivance, artfully devised by the
Christians of Europe when they were incapable of meeting the Muslim armies on the
battlefield. It is this musket, which even if a woman were to fire it, she could hold up
so many men. Had we chosen to use this weapon, you would not have preceded us in
its use. But we are people who do not discard the sunna of our Prophet Muhammad,
which is the jihad in the path of God, with sword and lance…Woe to you: how can
you shoot with firearms against those who testify to the unity of God and the
Prophethood of Muhammad?
For centuries the Ottoman rulers presented themselves as ‘fighters of the faith’ whose
duty it was to continually advance the frontiers of Islam by submitting their Christian
neighbors to their laws. 52 The early leaders of the Ottoman state had risen from nomad chiefs
to lords of an empire mainly through combat with Christians. 53 Therefore the Ottoman sultan
was considered to be the greatest of the gazi warriors, and his responsibility was to constantly
advance the frontiers and laws of orthodox Sunni Islam, especially against the Christians. 54
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However, for the Muslims living under the Mamluks, it appeared as though the Ottomans
were more Christian than Muslim.
Selim’s reign was one of the most formative times in the history of the Ottoman
Empire, because his advances in the Middle East enabled the Ottoman sultan to present
himself for the first time as the official representative of Islam on the world stage. While it
was Selim who transformed the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East, it was his son and
successor, Süleyman, who inspired true fear throughout western Europe. With the death of
Selim on September 22, 1520, the West was incorrectly led to believe that Süleyman was a
peaceable ruler and of no threat. At first it appeared that Selim’s death had freed Europe from
the danger of the Muslim Turks, and that the new sultan was “a meek lamb succeeding a
fierce lion.” 55 After the dissipation of a united European crusade under Pope Leo X,
Gucciardini noted that Selim left “his great empire to Suleiman, his son, a young man but
reputed to be more mild-spirited (although the results demonstrated otherwise) and not
disposed to make war.” 56 Since The History was written in retrospect, this account reveals
just how wrong the Europeans were about the new sultan. Süleyman officially inherited the
position on September 30, 1520, and by August 1521 he had successfully captured Belgrade
and in December 1522 expelled the Hospitallers from the island of Rhodes. 57 After
Süleyman’s first military victory in 1521, the European attitude towards the Turks began to
harden. Unlike Selim, his successor showed from the beginning of his reign that western
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expansion and the fight against the Infidel was just as important as the struggle against the
heretical Safavids in the east. 58
Süleyman’s victories against Belgrade and Rhodes were vital on strategic and
religious levels, because Süleyman was able to establish himself as a gazi and as the
figurehead of Islamdom early on in his career, and both locations were helpful for future
attacks on Europe. By taking Belgrade, the sultan had taken the “outer wall of Christendom,”
and this resulted in the Ottomans occupying land uncomfortably close to the Germanies. 59
While his victory at Rhodes secured the island for Muslim traders, resulted in Ottoman
supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean, and gave the Ottomans a strategic base to attack
Italy and Spain. These early conquests resulted in widespread fear throughout Europe, and is
evidenced in the propaganda, literature, and art that Europeans produced throughout his
reign. Diarist Marin Sanudo included a summary of the report from Venice’s former
ambassador to the sultan, Marco Minio, in his entry for April 8, 1522. Minio actually spent
time in the Ottoman Empire under the new sultan, and his account described Süleyman’s
resources, households, navy, and his temperament. According to Minio:
This sultan is a perfect Turk and very observant of his own law, he is the enemy of
the Christians and the Jews and mistreats the Jews in his territories, which did not
happen in the days of Selim, his father. This is a person who informs himself, who
does not like to be told what to do but who instead forms opinions that he clings to
stubbornly. I do not believe that he will be a peaceful person, but will soon show that
he is most warlike. Now that he has taken Belgrade, he thinks that he holds the keys
to Christendom in his hands. 60
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Süleyman’s victory at Belgrade gave the Ottomans a foothold in central Europe and
imbedded them in Hungarian politics throughout his entire reign. His involvement in
Hungary and Rhodes resulted in the Ottomans coming face to face with the Hapsburgs in the
Holy Roman Empire and the Mediterranean.
Guicciardini briefly mentioned the Ottoman conquest of Rhodes, recalling that “the
most unhappy event at the end of the year 1522 was the capture of the island of Rhodes, to
the greatest infamy of Christian princes, by Suleiman Ottoman.” 61 Even though the Knights
of Rhodes sometimes pillaged Christian vessels in the Mediterranean, they were ultimately
“a bulwark of the Christian religion in those seas,” and the loss of the island to Muslims was
an affront to all of Christendom. 62 For Latin Christians like Guicciardini it did not help that:
Suleiman, for the greater contempt of the Christian religion, made his entrance into
that city on the birthday of the Son of God; on which day, celebrated with endless
songs and music in Christian churches, he had all the churches of Rhodes, dedicated
to the cult of Christ, converted into mosques dedicated to the Mohammedan religion,
and according to their custom all Christian rites exterminated. 63
The Ottomans occupying Belgrade was a cause for alarm throughout all of Europe,
and this fear was especially evident throughout the Germanies. The dread of a possible
Turkish advance into German lands was expressed throughout a series of printed pamphlets
from 1522 to 1543, known as the Türkenbüchlein. These expressed the reactions of the
German people to the invasions of Hungary and Austria by Süleyman, and contain a great
deal of anti-Turkish propaganda. Various authors like Martin Luther, Andreas Osiander,
Justus Jonas, and lesser figures regarded the Turks as the aggressive representatives of the
world of Islam, and believed that they were a scourge inflicted upon Christendom by an
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angry God. Therefore these tracts are a mirror of the thought and feeling of sixteenth century
Germans towards the sultan and the Turk. 64 They also demonstrate the evolving perception
of the Turk as Süleyman continued to advance further into Hungary and the Holy Roman
Empire throughout his reign.
The first Türkenbüch appeared in the spring of 1522, a few months after the fall of
Belgrade. This anonymous pamphlet, originally titled Turken biechlin, discussed the Turkish
threat to Central Europe and Christendom in the form of a dialogue. It takes place outside the
walls of Belgrade after the siege and features a Turkish spy (the villain), his assistant, a
gypsy, a Hungarian worried about the future of his country, and a Catholic hermit (the hero)
who is very concerned about the Turkish threat to all of Christendom. The Turk is confident
that Süleyman will continue to make more conquests, and boasted of the sultan’s power
which he attributed to the civil and military virtues of the Turks and their unity under the
absolute authority of the sultan. He continued by belittling the Christians for fighting against
one another and for their lack of unity against the Ottomans. 65
Even though European literature from the sixteenth century reflects the negative
perceptions that Europeans had of the Turks, it also reveals the aspects of the Ottoman
Empire that Western writers commended, like the unity of the Empire under one sultan.
Authors like Guicciardini in Florence, Sanudo in Venice, Erasmus in the Netherlands, and
Luther in the Germanies all lamented the internecine fighting between the rulers of
Christendom that characterized the sixteenth century, and it is a common trope throughout
literature from this time. Therefore, the hero of the Turken biechlin admitted that the
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Christians and their rulers have their shortcomings, and noted that it would not be easy to
fight the Turks since the Christians have provoked God with their sins. While God allowed
the Turk to become powerful enough to punish the Christians, the hermit branded the sultan a
tyrant who must be stopped. The author’s main argument emphasized that the Christians
must desist from sin and correct their affairs before they could free themselves from the
Turk. After this pamphlet appeared, it became a best seller and its themes reoccurred in other
tracts as these ideas were typical of the age. 66
After taking Belgrade in 1521, Süleyman turned his attention to the Mediterranean
and did not resume his offensive on the Danube until four years later in 1526. The sultan was
again victorious at the Battle of Mohacs and destroyed the political independence of the
Magyar kingdom. The young King Louis II of Hungary (r. 1516-26) lost his life in this battle,
and the dynasty of the Jagellions died with him. This resulted in one faction of the Magyar
nobility electing the Hapsburg emperor-elect Ferdinand (r. 1521-64), while the other chose
King John Zápolya of Transylvania (r.1526-40). Zápolya applied to the Porte for Turkish
aide, and in turn Süleyman hoped to use him as a puppet ruler. The alliance concluded
between the two in 1528, and Süleyman recognized Zápolya as King of Hungary in return for
vassalage and tribute. 67 Shortly after the sultan’s third European victory, an anonymous and
undated Türkenbüch appeared, Excerpt from a Letter Written by a Resident of Turkey to His
Friend in These [German] Lands. This tract was widely read and designed to warn the
Germans that the Turk could be efficient and powerful, therefore Christians should be on
their guard. The author urged the Germans to stop their factional quarrels and recommended
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vigilance rather than immediate action. 68 However, the Turkish threat faded into the
background as Süleyman withdrew from his affront on Europe for a few years, and the
subjects of the Holy Roman Empire were embroiled in the Reformation.
Luther did not issue a detailed report of his views on the Turkish problem until the
winter of 1528-9 when he wrote On the War against the Turks (Vom Kriege wider die
Turken). In late 1526 at the end of a pamphlet debating Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved
(Ob Kriegsleute auch in seligen Stande sein konnen), he claimed it was useless to write on
the Turkish war, since the sultan returned home and the Germans lost interest. 69 In 1528 as
the Turkish danger again made itself apparent, Luther related his opinion on the topic which
reiterated similar themes found throughout the Türkenbüchlein. He began by drawing
attention to his original statement that was condemned by the papacy “To fight the Turk is
the same as resisting God, who visits our sin upon us with this rod.” 70 He argued that:
The popes had never seriously intended to wage war against the Turk; instead they
used the Turkish war as a cover for their game and robbed Germany of money by
means of indulgences whenever they took the notion. The whole world knew it, but
now it is forgotten. So they condemned my article because it opposed the Turkish
war, but because it tore away this cloak and blocked the path along which the money
went to Rome….If there had been a general opinion that serious war was at hand, I
could have polished my article somewhat more and made some distinctions….But
what motivated me most of all was this: They undertook to fight against the Turk in
the name of Christ, and taught and incited men to do this, as though our people were
an army of Christians against the Turks, who were enemies of Christ. This is
absolutely contrary to Christ’s doctrine and name…It is against his name because
there are scarcely five Christians in such an army, and perhaps there are worse people
in the eyes of God in that army than are the Turks; and yet they all want to bear the
name of Christ. 71
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Immediately, Luther decided to set the record straight on his controversial opinion by
making clear the reasons why he had objected in the first place. Like other authors of the
Türkenbüchlein he viewed the Turks as a punishment from God, and in order to wage a war
against them he declared that the “fight must be begun with repentance, and we must reform
our lives or we shall fight in vain...” 72 He also shared the belief that after Christians began to
amend their ways, “they should then be most diligently exhorted to prayer and shown that
such prayer pleases God…” 73 For Luther it was imperative that kings and the German
princes take Süleyman and his army seriously because “the Turk is a mighty lord that no
kingdom or land, whatever it is, is strong enough to resist him alone, unless God performs a
miracle.” 74 If war was to be undertaken against the Turks, then “it should be fought at the
emperor’s command, under his banner, and in his name.” 75 While Charles V and the
Catholics emphasized the role of the Holy Roman Emperor as that of defender of the faith,
Luther and his followers disagreed, instead they believed Charles should lead the fight as a
secular figurehead. This booklet appeared around ten days before Süleyman’s first siege of
Vienna, and Luther began to work on and finish his second tract during the siege in the
autumn of 1529. 76
It was widely believed at this time that Süleyman was going to lead a great invasion
of Germany, and the siege of Vienna was just the first step, therefore Luther enclosed
proposals for action in his Army Sermon against the Turks (Heerpredigt wider den Turken).
While the Heerpredigt contained various points that Luther made in Vom Kriege, he also
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recommended the need for reform and prayer by all classes, laying waste to the land should
the Turks succeed, and if taken into captivity the memorization and teaching of the Lord’s
Prayer, the Ten Commandments, and the Creed. 77 Even though Luther still considered the
Turks to be a punishment from God, Süleyman’s display of magnificence and power during
his siege demonstrated to the Europeans, especially the Germans, how strong and legitimate
of a foe he truly was. At the time, it appeared that Süleyman was truly capable of taking the
Germanies, and the possibility of the Muslims laying waste to the Holy Roman Empire
appeared to be a real and immediate threat.
Although Süleyman and his army abandoned the siege of Vienna on October 14,
1529, there existed an atmosphere of uneasy anticipation throughout Europe for months after
the sultan returned to Istanbul. Within this panicked environment Erasmus wrote his own On
the War against the Turk (De bello turcico) on the eve of the Diet of Augsburg in 1530. 78
This treatise echoed the sentiments of the Türkenbüchlein and even Luther’s Vom Kriege in
that Erasmus also urged the Christian rulers to stop fighting each other, and believed that the
Turkish advance was a result of Christian sins. He contended that “we have been endlessly
fighting among ourselves over some useless plot of ground in what are worse than civil wars,
the Turks have vastly extended their empire or, rather, their reign of terror,” and that they
“owe their victories to our sins; we have opposed them but, as the results plainly show, God
has been angered against us. We assail the Turks with the selfsame eagerness with which
they invade the lands of others.” 79 Erasmus argued that “however cruel the deeds of the
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Turks, the same deeds committed against his fellow by a Christian are still more cruel.” 80 For
sixteenth century humanists and reformers the state of Christendom was compromised due to
violence against one another, and because of this God had allowed Süleyman and his Muslim
army to successfully invade Europe.
Erasmus continued by commenting on Luther’s original belief that “it is not lawful to
resist the Turks, because God is punishing the sins of his people through them,” by
concluding that war was acceptable, unless God expressly prohibits it. 81 Even though
Erasmus asserted that it was acceptable to pick up arms against the Ottomans, he also
emphasized that the “mass of Christians are wrong, on the other hand, in thinking that
anyone is allowed to kill a Turk, as one would a mad dog, for no better reason than that he is
a Turk.” 82 As a humanist and pacifist Erasmus did not condone the slaughter of Christians or
Turks for the mere sake of it, and believed that war must be undertaken with legitimate
reason. 83 Therefore, according to Erasmus if the Europeans were to make war against the
Turk it would have to be for legitimate reasons and under the leadership of the Holy Roman
Emperor and secular rulers, since he shared Luther’s objection to clerical leadership in war.
While Catholics tended to present the war against the Turk as a holy war, Protestants were
inclined to see the struggle as mostly secular and argued against papal intervention. 84
The German pamphleteers of the Türkenbüchlein regarded the Turk as the “hereditary
foe” (erbfeind) of Christendom, and in the vocabulary of these authors the word Turk was
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synonymous with Mahometan or Moslem. 85 As the sultan of the Ottomans, it was Süleyman
who was the embodiment of the Turk and the Muslim, as he was the representative of Islam
on the world stage. A perfect example of this is the image on the title page of Johannes
Haselberg’s tract from 1530, Des Türckische[n] Kaysers Heerzug, wie er von Constantinopel
Mit aller rüstung, zü Roß und Füß, zü wasser vnd Land (Fig. 4.). 86 This print illustrates
Süleyman and Emperor Charles V at the head of their armies, since there were “prophecies”
that Charles was meant to fill the role of the leader against Süleyman and the Turks, and
these beliefs circulated widely throughout the Germanies in pamphlets and folk songs. 87 It
was generally believed by sixteenth century Europeans and Ottomans that these men would
represent their religions in the ultimate clash of the faiths. Therefore the caption above the
Emperor identifies him as “Carolus, Roman Emperor, Archduke of Austria, etc.—protector
of Christendom” and “Sultan Suleiman, Turkish emperor—a hereditary enemy of the
Christian faith.” 88 Now that the Ottoman sultan held the position of Caliph of the Muslim
world, he represented Islam on a global scale for the first time.
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Figure 4. Johann Haselberg, Emperor Charles V, “protector of Christendom,” and Sultan Suleiman, “hereditary
enemy of the Christian faith,” 1530. (Johann Haselberg, Des Türckische[n] Kaysers Heerzug [Nuremberg, 1530].
Austrian National Library.) From: John W. Bohnstedt: “The Infidel Scourge of God: The Turkish Menace as Seen
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While the early Ottomans had emphasized their role as gazis in their fight against the
Christians, the battles and conquests tended to be on the fringe of western Europe, therefore
in the Middle Ages the Ottomans were never a true threat to the heart of Latin Christendom.
Selim’s conquests against the Safavids and the Mamluks in the beginning of the sixteenth
century not only secured the position of the Ottoman sultan as caliph, but also helped enable
Süleyman to turn his attention to the west and lead his offense into Europe as he hacked into
the frontiers of Christendom. Although the European perception of the Turk remained
negative after the sultanate of Mehmed the Conqueror, it was during the beginning of the
early modern period that this view truly began to harden. When European authors did
commend the Ottomans, it was usually to draw attention to the deficits of the Christians and
to instigate reform. However, even though the Ottomans and the Europeans considered one
another to be infidels and enemies of the faith, their relationship depended just as much on
diplomacy as it did war.
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Chapter 2: Charles and Süleyman and Universal Sovereignty
The ascension of Süleyman to the Ottoman sultanate on September 30, 1520, marked
the beginning of a new generation of rulers in Europe and the Ottoman Empire. Süleyman
and the European monarchs Henry VIII of England (r. 1509-47), Francis I of France (r. 151547), and Holy Roman Emperor Charles V were the first generation of early modern rulers.
Even though these men were heavily indebted to medieval ideals and traditions throughout
their lives, they helped usher Europe and the Ottoman Empire into the early modern period.
While all four of these sovereigns played significant roles and battled one another, it was
Süleyman and Charles who represented their nations and religions on the world stage. These
two men took their religious positions seriously, and believed it was their duty to lead the
struggle between Christians and Muslims. However, the fight between Charles and Süleyman
was not simply one of religion, it was also a contest for territory and universal sovereignty.
Throughout Charles’s reign he had two serious enemies, one internal and the other
external. Within Europe, Charles’s biggest rival was the French King Francis I, and these two
men warred with one another over dynastic and territorial property. Charles inherited the
rivalry with the French king from his Spanish and Hapsburg grandfathers, Ferdinand of
Aragon and Emperor Maximilian I. In order to prevent the French from gaining more land,
Mary of Burgundy married Maximilian Hapsburg, thus linking central Europe with the
Netherlands. 89 In turn they arranged for their son Philip to marry Juana of Castile and
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Aragon. 90 Ferdinand also married his daughter Catherine of Aragon to Prince Arthur of
Wales; however, when Arthur died in 1502, Ferdinand secured her marriage to Arthur’s
younger brother, Henry VIII, in 1509. 91 In doing this Ferdinand’s main goals were to
preserve Aragonese possessions in Italy, and to prevent any further expansion of French
power. Not only did Charles inherit the Burgundian and Hapsburg lands from his paternal
grandparents, but due to the dynastic marriages between the children of the Catholic
Monarchs and the Hapsburgs, and a series of unfortunate deaths, Charles became the king of
Aragon and Castile and that kingdom’s Atlantic possessions. This inheritance and his
election to the position of Holy Roman Emperor in 1520 made Charles ruler over the largest
empire of the age, and gave him hegemony over most of Europe.
Charles’s primary driving factor for war was often to maintain his hereditary
territories, and in doing so he mostly came into conflict with Francis. There was a web of
claims and counter-claims between Charles and Francis that included the Netherlands and
Burgundy, the kingdom of Navarre connecting Castile and Aragon, Naples, and Milan.
Burgundy and Milan were at the heart of the conflict between Charles and Francis. 92 The
duchy of Milan was the chief prize in contention between the Hapsburgs and France, because
each one believed that Milan was his birthright. 93 Although the rulers of the Netherlands and
Belgium called themselves the Dukes of Burgundy, the French had seized the province of
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Burgundy and the ancestral lands of the Burgundian dukes in 1477. 94 Throughout the
numerous peace negotiations that took place between Francis and Charles regarding Milan,
the possession of Burgundy played a key role in either making or breaking the truce.
Charles was under the influence of his Francophile adviser, Guillaume de Croÿ, Lord
of Chièvres from 1508 until 1521. 95 Chièvres was concerned with containing the French
while not openly contesting them. Therefore on March 24, 1515, he secured the Treaty of
Paris with Francis on Charles’s behalf, which temporarily pacified the dispute over the
boundaries in Italy and allowed Francis to pursue Milan. 96 Francis’s first major battle and
victory took place on September 13 and 14, 1515 at Marignano against the Sforza duke, and
it greatly enhanced his prestige and honor as a warrior-king. In the Treaty of Noyon of 1516,
Charles officially renounced his claim to Milan. 97 There was peace between Charles and
Francis until 1519 when Emperor Maximilian I died, and Charles, Francis, and Henry vied
for the position of Holy Roman Emperor. In The History of Italy, Guicciardini noted that
originally Maximilian wanted the role of emperor:
….conferred upon his grandchild Ferdinand, for it seemed proper that since so many
states and so much power had been lavished on the older brother, the other should be
bolstered by this position….nevertheless, urged to the contrary by many of his
courtiers and by the Cardinal Sedunense, and by all those who feared and hated the
power of the French, his first recommendation was rejected, and he turned his mind to
see to it that this dignity should be assumed by the King of Spain. Those who
counseled the Emperor proved that it would be much more useful for the exaltation of
the house of Austria to concentrate all that power in a single person, than to divide it
in several parts, which would make them less capable of carrying out their designs. 98
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Ultimately, Charles was elected over Francis, which strained their relationship and hampered
Francis’s attempts to contain Charles’s power and authority. 99
Italy, specifically Milan, became strategically important to Charles in 1521 when
Chièvres died and was replaced with the imperialist-minded Mercurino Arborio de Gattinara.
As a student of Dante, Gattinara believed that the key to the domination of Christendom lay
in Italy and that it would serve as the seat of empire. He advocated the Dantesque vision of a
jurist-emperor, who would reassert justice and be the guardian and expositor of Roman
law. 100 In 1519, Gattinara told a young Charles that “God has been merciful to you. He has
raised you above all the kings and princes in Christendom to a power such as no sovereign
has enjoyed since your ancestor Charlemagne. He has set you on the path towards a world
monarchy, towards uniting Christendom under a single shepherd.” 101 The humanist ideal of a
united Christendom remained a key goal throughout Charles’s lifetime, even though he
claimed several times that he had no desire to obtain a global monarchy.
By tradition the Holy Roman Emperor was the figurehead of Christendom, and
Charles took the religious ideological commitment of his imperial title seriously. 102
Immediately, Charles began to emphasize his role as the leader in the fight against the Turks
and Islam. Süleyman was also considered a defender of his faith and descended from a long
line of Ottoman gazi warriors. From the late thirteenth century on, the Ottoman tribal
chieftains advanced the frontier struggle to the level of gazi ideology, thus these fighters on
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the marches were no longer engaged in raiding but in holy war. 103 However, Süleyman was
the first Ottoman sultan that could legitimately present himself as the true protector of Islam
due to Selim’s conquest of the Mamluk Empire in Egypt. Now that Süleyman held the title of
“Servant of the Two Sanctuaries” the Ottoman sultan was the key figure in the holy war
against Christendom.
At the beginning of the sixteenth century, in both Islamic and Christian lands there
were prophecies that a single ruler would be sovereign over the entire world, therefore the
struggle between Islam and Christianity was projected onto a global stage headed by Charles
and Süleyman. 104 Throughout western Europe and the Ottoman empire existed millenarian
prophecies and apocalyptic expectations of the coming of a universal monarch, who was
presented as the “Last World Emperor.” 105 Within Europe, this prediction was ultimately
influenced by the Calabrian abbot, Joachim of Fiore, in the twelfth century. As the
Joachimist outlook developed throughout the later Middle Ages, it emphasized the idea of a
monarch of the entire world who would be a second Charlemagne, would renew the church,
rebuke its ministers, and conquer the Turk. 106 Under this ruler all non-Christians would be
converted, and following his reign would be the “millennium,” a thousand-year reign of
Christ, and the Last Judgment.
In 1488, the astrologer-prophet Johann Lichtenberger foreshadowed the coming of a
Burgundian world emperor who would rise to be the ruler of all Europe so that he could
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reform the church and clergy in his Prognosticatio. 107 Based on predictions like this,
Gattinara and Charles’s propagandists portrayed him as the future re-conqueror of Jerusalem
as early as 1515, and by 1519-20 Charles’s titulature referred to him as the “King of Spain,
Sicily, Jerusalem, the Balearic Islands, Hungary, Dalmatia, Croatia and the Indies.” Charles
actually had no claim to Jerusalem, as it was under Süleyman’s control, and this was another
point of contention between the two sovereigns. 108
From an early date key members of Charles’s entourage, like Gattinara, promoted the
idea that he was designated by God to be imperator mundi. Throughout Gattinara’s time as
rand Chancellor (1520-1530) he greatly influenced Charles, and was the chief protagonist of
the idea of world empire. The imperialistic minded Gattinara impressed upon Charles that the
key to the domination of Christendom lay in Italy and the fight against the Turk. Even though
Charles disclaimed his desire to obtain monarchia in his mature years and in his abdication
speech in 1556, his ambitions and actions as a young man under the influence of Gattinara
proved otherwise.
I had no inordinate ambition to rule a multitude of kingdoms, but merely sought to
secure the welfare of Germany, to provide for the defense of Flanders, to consecrate
my forces to the safety of Christianity against the Turks and to labor for the extension
of the Christian religion…In order that I might not be wanting in my duty I risked my
strength, my repose and my life for the safety of Christianity and the defense of my
subjects…” 109
After Gattinara died so did Charles’s dream of universal sovereignty, especially in regard to
the struggle against Süleyman. Even though Charles continued to fight against Süleyman
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after 1530, his campaigns against the Turk were in the defense of his own interests and
territories, and were couched in the rhetoric of holy war and crusade.
Like Charles and his Grand Chancellor, Süleyman was equally influenced by his
boyhood friend and Grand Vizier İbrahim Paşa (r. 1526-36). İbrahim was outraged by
Charles’s claims to universal sovereignty and contended that there could only be one
emperor in the world, the Ottoman sultan. 110 In the minds of Europeans it appeared that
Charles was set up for global domination, and in the world of theory and rhetoric he and his
advisers portrayed himself as the ruler who would be successful in not only stopping the
Turk but in uniting Christendom. Guicciardini commented on these hopes for Charles as
early as 1518:
And they argued that Charles’ greatness resting upon such mighty foundations, one
might hope that, having achieved the imperial crown, he would perforce reduce all of
Italy and a great part of Christendom into a single monarchy: a state of affairs which
not only would redound to the greatness of his descendants, but also to the peace of
his subjects, and with respect to the infidels, to the benefit of all Christendom. 111
However, in reality Charles was never capable of fulfilling these extravagant claims,
because he was not a true emperor and his monarchia was made up of various hereditary
territories that had nothing in common other than a sovereign. Charles’s title as Holy Roman
Emperor was just that, a title, and throughout his reign while he took the title seriously his
role was completely undermined by the growing power of German princes and the Protestant
Reformation. Machiavelli’s assessment of the Holy Roman Emperor in the Discourses on
Livy was correct in that he was a “shadow of an emperor” who exercised “no direct
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power.” 112 Based on power, authority, resources, and military prowess it was Süleyman, not
Charles, who was closer to the sixteenth century ideal of a universal sovereign.
Even though Süleyman exerted an absolute authority that was not witnessed in
Europe until the seventeenth century, he was similar to Charles in that he allowed his
advisers to influence his decisions and actions. While Süleyman’s reign is generally
considered to be the “Golden Age” of the Ottoman Empire, his sultanate marked the
beginning of the period in which the influence of grand viziers, advisers, and members of the
royal household rose significantly. 113 The Sultan was especially influenced during the
thirteen years that İbrahim was grand vizier, and throughout this time the Ottoman Empire
experienced an increase in spending and patronage of European art. Despite the fact that the
Ottoman Empire was a society not interested in change, but in preservation of the existing
order, İbrahim ensured that Süleyman utilized European symbols of power to assert his own
universal sovereignty. 114
İbrahim was originally born a subject of the Republic of Venice in the town of Parga,
and throughout his time as grand vizier he continued to keep a close relationship and
patronage with the Venetians (Fig. 5). At age six, he was taken captive by pirates who sold
him as a slave into an elite Ottoman household, and met Süleyman when they were in their
teens. When Süleyman became sultan, İbrahim followed him to Istanbul and they were so
inseparable that the Venetian bailo Pietro Bragadin referred to him as “the heart and breath
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of the Sultan.” 115 Süleyman continuously advanced his friend’s career until 1523 when he
replaced his father’s old grand vizier, Piri Mehmed, with İbrahim. İbrahim’s role as grand
vizier and governor-general of Rumeli made him the second highest official in the Ottoman
Empire along with being the titular head of the Ottoman civil and military administration. 116
As soon as İbrahim took office he began to present the Ottoman sultan as the true emperor of
the age, and immediately sought to counter the claims of the Hapsburg monarch and his
Grand Chancellor.
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Figure 5. Sebald Beham, Sendbrief so Imbraym Wascha, 1529, hand-colored woodcut, 310 x 195 mm. The British
Museum, London. From: The British Museum Online,
http://www.britishmuseum.org/research/collection_online/collection_object_details.aspx?objectId=1418635&partId
=1&searchText=hand+beham&page=2 (accessed June 06, 2017).

This image comes from a broadside on the Turkish siege of Vienna, with a hand-colored woodcut by
Sebald Beham depicting Grand Vizier İbrahim Paşa on horseback, including a letterpress letter above
from the Vizier, printed in Nuremberg, Germany.
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Prophecies of a universal ruler were also significant throughout the Ottoman Empire
during Süleyman’s reign. 117 Soon after he ascended the throne, books of prophecy began to
appear. The Gurbetnâme (Tale of Exile), most likely written in the early 1520s by a member
of Süleyman’s retinue, is an account of the brother of Bayezid II, Cem Sultan’s captivity in
Christendom between 1483 until his death in 1495. According to the author:
However, the late [prince] had acquired from a Venetian scholar a book of history;
there it was written that after the year 920 [1514] one named Sultan Süleyman, of the
House of Osman, would become emperor [padişah]. In his first campaigns for the
Faith [gaza] he would attack Hungary and, after many battles and conquests would
attempt several times, without success, to mount sea-campaigns [against Rome].
Thereafter he would create a fleet that none could resist, and wherever he intended
conquest he would be victorious. This sultan of the gazis and warriors for the faith,
Sultan Süleyman Han (God glorify his helpers!), would himself come to Rome,
conquer it, and kill countless of its commanders and learned, including the pope of
the time. The Emperor, refuge of the world (may he not cease to be bound to God’s
protection), that is, Sultan Süleyman -Shah, would water and feed his horse in the
founts of their churches [St. Peter’s], annex Rome to the rest of his domains, and
remain there for some time dispensing justice; thus had they written in their books
eight hundred years before the year 894 [1489, the date of Cem’s arrival in Rome].
When the late prince recounted this great thing, they [i.e., the assembled papal
retinue] seemed to have [the book] as well; they fetched the very same book, and on
comparison they found the same account with yet more detail. 118
At this time predictions influenced public opinion and were utilized by those who created the
sultan’s image, specifically İbrahim and his close friend Lodovico Gritti, the illegitimate son
of the doge of Venice who advised the Ottomans on affairs related to the Hapsburgs and
Hungary. Diarist Marin Sanudo noted in his diary that the new grand vizier told the Venetian
bailo on the eve of the campaign to Mohacs in March 1526 that:

117

Ágoston, “Information, Ideology, and Limits of Imperial Policy,” 99.
İsmail Hami Danişmend as “Gurbet-name-i Sultan Cem ibini Sultan Muhammed,” in Fatih ve
İstanbul II/12 (1954): 227-228, quoted in Cornell H. Fleischer, “Shadows of Shadows: Prophecy in Politics in
1530s Istanbul,” in Identity and Identity Formation in the Ottoman World: A Volume of Essays in Honor of
Norman Itzkowitz, ed. Baki Tezcan and Karl K. Barbir (Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2007),
52-53.
118

48
The Sultan and he [İbrahim], as youths, had seen an old book in which it was written
that he [i.e., Süleyman] would leave the Harem [to take the throne], one who had
never had high office would be made first vizier and beylerbeyi of Greece [Rumeli]
and would be named İbrahim. Then the Ottoman lord, and his [İbrahim’s] time,
would do many things which his ancestors had never been able to do: To take the
Roman Empire, and give battle to the Christians in great campaigns. He would assault
the Christians, and wage three great battles, from which the Turkish lord would twice
emerge vanquished; but in the third attempt he would take the Roman Empire and all
its noble captains and would be victorious; it would be a great victory, by grace of
God. He [the sultan] would liberate [the Empire] and all others, and there would be
but one religion, in peace and mutual love, and he believes that this must certainly
come about. 119
İbrahim believed that Süleyman was the new world conqueror, and helped to portray
him as the successor of Alexander the Great and Caesar. 120 Like the Europeans, the Ottomans
relied on the rhetoric and imagery of classic Greece and Rome as a means to exert their
authority and to legitimate their claims. Charles and Süleyman ruled over an unprecedented
amount of land which had not been seen since the time of Alexander, and from the period of
1520 to 1530 it actually seemed as though one of them could successfully suppress the
ambitions of the other. After Gattinara died, so did Charles’s perceived role as universal
emperor, although Charles and his propagandists continued to emphasize his role as the
paladin of Christendom in the fight against the Muslim Turks. The Ottoman projection of
Süleyman as the “Last World Emperor” also died along with İbrahim in 1536. Even though
the idea of universal sovereignty fell dormant with their advisers, Charles and Süleyman
continued to battle against each other and counter act one another’s assertions throughout
their reigns.
Due to İbrahim’s influence, Süleyman s reign witnessed the formation of an Ottoman
grand strategy to counteract that of the Hapsburgs. Both strategies involved the creation of an
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imperial ideology and universalist vision of empire, along with the collection of information
within and outside the empires. The gathering of material on happenings of Europe and its
monarchs helped keep the sultan and the grand vizier abreast of European politics and
culture, which helped integrate the Ottomans into the events of sixteenth century Europe. 121
The Europeans were also well aware of Süleyman’s imperial aspirations. In 1527 in a speech
before the Castilian Cortez, Gattinara listed the conquests of the Ottomans and reminded his
audience that the sultan already ruled over an empire much larger than that of Alexander the
Great or the Caesars, he continued by warning the Cortez that Süleyman was determined to
build a world empire (la monarchia de tudo el mundo). 122 However for some, especially the
French, it appeared that Charles was the one determined to bring the world under his control
and acted as an Alexander redivivus. 123 Charles’s large territorial inheritance and aspirations
made him the biggest threat to other European rulers and their countries, not Süleyman and
the Ottomans.
After the Battle of Pavia in 1525, in which Francis became Charles’s prisoner for two
years, it appeared as though Charles was bent on European domination. The Emperor’s
dominance after the battle not only worried the French, but also the papacy and many Italian
states. In conjunction with Pope Leo X, the Hapsburg and papal armies pushed the French
out of Milan in November of 1521, and suzerainty over Milan reverted to Charles. 124 In
1522, Francis tried to reclaim Milan but was repulsed by Charles’s armies. 125 In another
attempt to regain the duchy, Francis personally commanded his men at the Battle of Pavia,
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and on February 24, 1525 was taken prisoner by the Hapsburg soldier, Charles de Lannoy. 126
Although the Emperor did not personally capture Francis, his troops’ victory advanced his
personal reputation and honor while also securing Hapsburg dominance of Italy. Francis was
humiliated by losing the battle and by being taken captive, and in a letter to his mother he
noted that “all that is left to me…is my honour and my life, which is safe.” 127
Charles did not grant the French King his freedom until he agreed to the Treaty of
Madrid on January 14, 1526. In return, Francis had to hand over his two eldest sons Francis
III and Henry II. Francis also had to renounce his claims in Italy, Artois, Flanders, and
Burgundy. However, handing Burgundy over to Charles was not a viable option for Francis,
and as soon as he returned to France he declared the treaty illegal as it required him to
surrender part of his royal patrimony, and it was also considered dishonorable because it was
made under duress. 128 Although Francis lived with the stigma of being an unreliable treaty
partner from 1526 until his death in 1547, he saw the Treaty of Madrid as a threat to his
honor and hereditary lands. 129 For Francis and his supporters, his refusal of the treaty did not
diminish his glory as a monarch, because it was not perceived as legitimate to begin with. In
August of 1526, Charles declared to a French diplomat that Francis “has cheated me; he has
acted neither as a knight nor as a nobleman, but basely. I demand that if he cannot fulfil his
treaty, the Most Christian King should keep his word or become my prisoner again. It would
be better for us to fight out this quarrel hand to hand than to shed so much Christian
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blood.” 130 The disputes and skirmishes between Charles and Francis continued throughout
their lives, and were also carried on by their successors into the seventeenth century.
On and off throughout Francis’s reign he claimed that he was dedicated to the fight
against the Turk, however that did not stop him from making numerous alliances with the
Ottomans, and from 1525 on Francis allied with them to counteract Hapsburg sovereignty. 131
In February of 1526, the French sent Ambassador Jean Frangipani to Istanbul to inform the
Sultan that if Francis submitted to Charles it would “make him the master of the world.”
Frangipani returned with a friendly letter from Süleyman promising to lend aid to Francis,
thus establishing an Ottoman and French alliance in order to counteract the power and claims
of the Hapsburg Charles. 132 For the Most Christian King of France, Charles’s hereditary
lands and his position as Holy Roman Emperor endangered the balance of power within
Europe, and this made him more of a threat and enemy than the Ottoman sultan. Therefore,
Francis proclaimed that he could not “deny that I am most anxious to see the Turk remain
very powerful and ready for war, not on his own account—for he is an infidel, and the rest of
us are Christians—but to weaken the emperor’s power, force him to heavy expenditures, and
reassure all other governments against so great an enemy.” 133
While the Franco-Ottoman alliance shocked many in Christendom, alliances between
Muslim and Christian entities were not uncommon. 134 Especially during the classical age of
the Crusades, it was normal for Christians to ally with Muslims against other Christians, and
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vice versa, based on territorial or sovereignty disputes. However, Hapsburg propaganda
portrayed Francis as an international Judas, who betrayed Christendom for his own means.
Despite this Charles also accepted the necessity of making deals with Islam in lieu of war. 135
In order to counteract Francis and Süleyman, the Emperor tried to establish relations with the
Sultan’s Safavid Shi’a Muslim rivals. In 1529, Charles’s envoys met with Shah Ṭahmāsp I
(1514—1576), but unlike the alliance between the French and the Ottomans the interactions
between the Hapsburgs and Safavids had almost no positive or military effect. 136 For
Charles, the Shah and Persia presented no physical or ideological threat to Charles or his
kingdoms, whereas Süleyman and the Ottoman Turks did. Süleyman and Charles were not
always at war with one another, and when they were busy with other problems within their
territories they also understood the benefit of diplomacy over war.
Titulature played a large and significant role in emphasizing territorial claims and
exerting power and legitimacy, and the titles that the European and Ottoman rulers gave to
themselves and others was indicative of their rivalries. 137 For example, in Ottoman
documents, Süleyman and İbrahim usually referred to Charles as the kıral (king) of Spain,
whereas Francis was usually called padişah (emperor) of France. In Süleyman’s relationship
with the King of France, the sultan understood that he was the one in the position of power
and immediately established this through titulature in his first correspondence with Francis
after the Battle of Pavia. In order to establish his credibility and authority as a ruler,
Süleyman began his letter by enumerating his titles and divinely appointed status:
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I who am the Sultan of Sultans, the sovereign of sovereigns, the dispenser of crowns
to the monarchs on the face of the lord of the White Sea and the Black Sea, if
Rumelia and of Anatolia, of Karamania, of the land of Rum, of Zulkadria, of
Diarbekir, of Kurdistan, of Azerbijan, of Persia, of Damascus, of Aleppo, of Cairo, of
Mecca, of Medina, of Jerusalem, of all Arabia, of Yemen, and of many other lands
which my noble forefathers and my glorious ancestors (may God light up their
tombs!) conquered by the force of their arms, and sword and my victorious blade, I,
Sultan Suleiman Khan, son of Sultan Selim Khan, son of Sultan Bayezid Khan. 138
For the Holy Roman Emperor and his Grand Chancellor, titulature was just as
important in projecting and legitimizing Charles’s sovereignty against the claims of Francis
and Süleyman. Around 1530, Gattinara tailored Charles’s imperial titles so that they would
fit the different areas that he ruled over, and were translated into the vernacular of that
region. While the titles differed from kingdom to kingdom, they all began with “By divine
clemency King of the Romans and Emperor elect, semper Augustus,” and listed the different
areas that Charles ruled over. The German designation was originally in Latin and declared
“Charles, by divine clemency King of the Romans, future Emperor, semper augustus, King
of the Spaniards, Two Sicilies, Jerusalem, the Baleares, Canaries, the Indian islands and
islands and firm lands in the Ocean Sea, Archduke of Austria, Duke of Burgundy, etc.” 139
Charles’s assertion that he was the king of Jerusalem proved to be problematic, because in
reality Süleyman controlled the city. Charles’s claim to be the King of Jerusalem upset
İbrahim and Süleyman since it was an encroachment upon the sovereignty of the Ottoman
sultan, therefore the Grand Vizier conveyed his disgust to Hapsburg envoys:
Why does he enumerate with such arrogance the titles that are his, and those that are
not his? Wherefore does he presume to style himself to my lord as King of
Jerusalem? Is he ignorant of the fact that my mighty Emperor and not himself,
Charles, is Lord of Jerusalem?...If my master should write down all the provinces that
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are his, where would be the end to it? Nor would he usurp those of other people, as
Charles does. 140
Not only was Charles’s claim to be the King of Jerusalem problematic for Süleyman
and İbrahim, but his title of emperor was as well. For the Ottoman sultan and his vizier the
word “emperor” implied supremacy over all rulers, thus Charles’s use of the term encroached
upon Süleyman’s sovereignty because in the eyes of him and İbrahim there could only be one
legitimate emperor. In 1529, when Charles began to prepare for his official coronation as
Holy Roman Emperor, İbrahim asked the Venetian bailo Pietro Zen, “How can there be an
emperor other than my grand signor?” 141 Due to Gattinara’s and Charles’s broad assertions
of sovereignty, it was the Grand Vizier who was essential in helping Süleyman counteract
these claims in a way familiar to Europeans.
During İbrahim’s time as vizier, his close relationship and patronage with Venice was
essential in helping Süleyman exert his sovereignty vis-à-vis Charles. İbrahim understood the
benefit of utilizing the titulature and regalia of the Europeans, and therefore he sought
European iconography for Süleyman to use in his competition with Charles, however, the
same cannot be said for the latter. Even though Charles was battling Süleyman for the
position of universal sovereign, he and his advisers did not make use of Ottoman regalia.
Despite the Ottomans being a society not really interested in change, they were actually more
open and accepting of other cultures than the Europeans. Since Süleyman was going head to
head against the leader of the European Christians, İbrahim made sure that the sultan
projected his claims through European means. Due to the Renaissance which also penetrated
into the Ottoman Empire, the iconography from ancient Rome was used by both monarchs in
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their bid for universal sovereignty. The idea of the Roman Empire played a large role
throughout the rhetoric, iconography and regalia, and titulature that Charles and Süleyman
used during their reigns. For these men, Roman iconography was central in legitimating and
asserting their sovereignty.
As Holy Roman Emperor, Charles theoretically represented the continuation of the
Roman Empire in western Europe, whereas the sultan portrayed himself as the inheritor of
Rome based on the Ottomans holding the lands of the old Byzantine Empire. Therefore,
Charles and Süleyman were rivals for the claim to be the true ruler of the Roman Empire.
Since Charles was the first Emperor to be crowned outside of Rome, his coronation in
Bologna in 1529 had to be ‘Romanized’ and legitimized so that his enemies could not declare
it void. 142 Instead of emphasizing his Hapsburg lineage, Charles employed Roman and
antique iconography to present himself as a Roman emperor in the tradition of Caesar,
Octavian, Titus, and Trajan. 143 Charles’s coronation was reminiscent of a Roman triumph,
specifically Caesar's four day long triumphant in the spring of 46 B.C.E. in Rome, which
celebrated his successful campaigns in Gaul, Egypt, Asia Minor, and Africa. As Charles
entered the city, he rode under triumphal arches as the people greeted him with shouts of
“Cesare, Cesare, Carlo, Carlo, Imperio, Imperio!” 144
The anonymous Venetian woodcut Charles V’s Entry into Bologna in 1529, gives
perfect insight into the Roman iconography that the Emperor utilized during his coronation
(Fig. 6). This image depicted Charles dressed in armor with an eagle on his helmet and a
scepter in his hand, along with four knights carrying a gold brocade canopy over his head.
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His pages also carried ceremonial helmets which had four plumed “helmets of Caesar” that
featured the Hapsburg eagle and a crown. 145 The use of a golden eagle on Charles's helmet
was strategic as it was commonly associated with the Greek (and Roman) god Zeus, and
alluded to Charles’s power. Not only did Charles’s coronation advertise his claim to be
Caesar of the Holy Roman Empire, but his joint procession with Pope Clement VII in 1530
promoted his claim for a universal empire (Fig. 7). Descriptions and images of Charles’s
joint procession with the pope also referred to triumphal arches, a gold brocade canopy, and a
Crusader’s flag showing Christ on a cross. 146 According to Guicciardini, this was “a day
most propitious for the Emperor, for on that day he had been born, on that day he had taken
the King of France prisoner, on that day he assumed the signs and ornaments of the imperial
dignity.” 147 This parade and procession with the pope not only presented Charles as a
triumphant Caesar, but also as the secular head and defender of Christendom.

145

Ibid., 410.
Ibid.
147
Guicciardini, The History of Italy, 426.
146

57

Figure 6. Anonymous, Charles V’s Entry into Bologna in 1529, ca. 1530, from a series of Venetian woodcuts.
Vienna, Albertina, Graphische Sammlung. From: Gülru Necipoğlu, “Süleyman the Magnificent and the
Representation of Power in the Context of Ottoman-Hapsburg-Papal Rivalry,” The Art Bulletin 71, no. 3 (1989):
413.
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Figure 7. Nicolaus Hogenberg, Procession of Pope Clement VII and the Emperor Charles V after the coronation at
Bologna on the 24th February, MDXXX, ca. 1535-1539. Print, 40 prints in 1 scroll : etchings, engravings,
watercolor, gouache, gold ; prints 39.5 x 29.7 cm, scroll 39.5 x 1241.3 cm. The Getty Research Institute, Los
Angeles. From: The Getty Research Institute Online,
http://rosettaapp.getty.edu:1801/delivery/DeliveryManagerServlet?dps_pid=IE483735 (accessed June 06, 2017).
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The news, art, and propaganda of Charles’s coronation was widely circulated, and
Süleyman and İbrahim paid close attention to his illustrious imperial claims. Even Francis
expressed the sultan’s distaste for Charles’s use of Caesar in a conversation with a Venetian
ambassador to the French court, “for Sultan Süleyman always says ‘to Rome! To Rome!’ and
he detests the emperor and his title of Caesar, he, the Turk, causing himself to be called
Caesar.” 148 During İbrahim’s time as grand vizier, he promoted the ideal of magnificence as
an indispensable attribute of sovereignty. 149 Due to this, İbrahim employed Venetian artists
to create European-Christian regalia for the sultan. According to a contemporary Italian
source it was İbrahim who urged Süleyman to undertake a second siege of Vienna in 1532 in
order to advertise his role as “imperator del mondo.” 150 The most interesting aspect of
Süleyman’s procession into the city was the Venetian regalia that İbrahim commissioned for
him. Even though items like crowns, scepters, orbs, and gold chains were foreign to the
Ottomans, İbrahim understood the benefit of using western status symbols since they were
helpful in communicating Ottoman imperial claims through European vocabulary. 151 The
regalia included horse furnishings, a scepter, a throne, and most notably a Venetian helmetcrown which were all pompously displayed when Süleyman entered Vienna, and similar to
Charles’s coronation, Süleyman incorporated Roman triumphal arches.
The most outstanding aspect of this procession, however, was Süleyman’s Venetian
helmet-crown (Fig. 8). Although it was fashioned with a tapering Islamic form and an
Ottomanizing crescent-shaped aigrette, it most importantly resembled Charles’s crown and
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the pope’s papal tiara (Fig. 9). Unlike the pope’s tiara which only had three tiers, Süleyman’s
helmet-crown featured an additional fourth tier and was meant as a statement of superiority
over Charles and the pope. 152 Thus the helmet-crown served as a universal claim of world
dominion meant to challenge Charles as the extra fourth crown indicated Ottoman
supremacy. İbrahim and Süleyman were fully aware of the legitimizing role of crowns in the
west, however, despite the prominence of the helmet-crown throughout Christian Europe, it
did not play a large role in legitimizing Süleyman’s rule throughout the Ottoman Empire.
Since it was an alien aspect to the Ottomans it was left out of account by Ottoman
contemporaries like historian Celâlazade, confirming that the helmet’s message was directed
at a western audience, especially Charles. 153
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Figure 8. Agostino Venziano, Portrait of Sultan Süleyman, 1535. Engraving,
434 x 295 mm. The British Museum, London. From: The British Museum
Online,
http://www.britishmuseum.org/research/collection_online/collection_object
_details.aspx?objectId=1445084&partId=1 (accessed June 06, 2017).

62

Figure 9. Domenico del Riccio (il Brusasorzi), details from a fresco depicting the coronation cavalcade
of Charles V and Clement VII, ca. 1564.

Found in Gülru Necipoğlu, “Süleyman the Magnificent and the Representation of Power in the
Context of Ottoman-Hapsburg-Papal Rivalry,” The Art Bulletin 1, no. 3 (1989): 414,
http://web.b.ebscohost.com.libproxy.unm.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=1&sid=ba03331
2-31a4-4f4b-9e21-d4f2499ed1da%40sessionmgr103 (accessed June 06, 2017).

Although Süleyman attempted to siege Vienna twice in the hopes that he could
engage the Emperor in battle, and Charles often proclaimed his desire to fight the Turk, the
two rulers never came into contact. When Charles became Holy Roman Emperor he declared
his ability for the preparation of a crusade against the Ottomans, but did not react to
Süleyman’s victories at Belgrade and Rhodes. 154 In 1519, he delineated control of the
Austrian hereditary lands of the Hapsburgs to his younger brother Ferdinand I, and the
defense of Hungary and Austria fell to the Archduke. 155 Despite the apparent danger to the
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Germanies, Ferdinand could not rely on Charles due to his engagement with the Protestant
conflict and his rivalry with Francis. 156 In leaving Ferdinand to defend Vienna, Charles also
conveyed the message that the defense of the Roman Empire had no priority to him as an
emperor. 157 The only times Charles actually turned his attention toward the Ottomans was
when they posed a threat to his hereditary possessions in the Mediterranean. To the Sultan
and the Emperor, war in the Mediterranean appeared to be more of an immediate advantage
than continuing enterprises in the Danube. 158
In 1518, Selim officially put Khair-ad-Din Barbarossa (c. 1466-1546) and his corsair
fleet under Ottoman protection. This greatly strengthened Ottoman naval power in the
Mediterranean, and by 1534 the Sultan appointed Barbarossa as Admiral of the Turkish fleet
(Fig. 10). 159 When Barbarossa captured Tunis on August 17 of that same year, Charles saw
this as a threat to the entire Mediterranean, especially Italy and Spain. 160 Not only did
Barbarossa claim Tunis for the Ottomans, but he also displaced Charles’s Muslim ally the
Hafsid ruler, Mulay Hassan. 161 Before Khair-ad-Din captured Tunis, his brother, Oruç
Barbarossa (c. 1474-1518), made Algiers their base of operations after they ejected the
Spaniards in 1516. After that, the Barbarossas were feared by Christians for their piracy
along the coasts of Italy and Iberia. 162 For Charles the safety of his hereditary lands in these
two countries was top priority, and both expected him to protect them and their merchants
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from the attacks of Barbary Corsairs. 163 Even though Süleyman was not physically present
for any of these campaigns, his rivalry with Charles was transformed into a struggle for the
Mediterranean through Barbarossa. 164 Charles fully understood the value of Mediterranean
commerce and sought to protect it whenever possible. 165 Since Tunis was the hub of the
western Mediterranean, it was vital to Charles for the security of the trade routes between
Spain and Italy, especially the Sicilian wheat trade. 166 For years the coasts and merchants of
Italy and Spain had been harassed by Muslim corsairs, and it continued to get worse after
Barbarossa captured Tunis. Due to this and the combined threat between Süleyman,
Barbarossa, and Francis to Spanish hegemony in the Mediterranean, Charles decided to
undertake his first campaign against the Ottoman Turks.
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Figure 10. Agostino Veneziano, Portrait of Barbaros Hayreddin Pasha, 1535.
Engraving, 44.8 x 30.5 cm. The Met Museum, New York. From: The Met
Museum Online, http://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/342972
(accessed June 06, 2017).

This image was commissioned by the Paşa. The artist’s rendition is an
example of a correct depiction of an Ottoman Turk, in contrast with the
numerous depictions of Turkish figures that were Orientalized.
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The Emperor’s campaign in Tunis was the first time that he ever led his armies into
battle. Although he officially began to rule his Burgundian territories in 1515, Castile and
Spain in 1516, and was formally anointed as Holy Roman Emperor in 1530, he did not
personally undertake his first military enterprise until 1535. 167 The expedition to Tunis was
meant to be portrayed and perceived as a crusade against the Turk from the very beginning.
As Charles began the preparations for his expedition, he hired Dutch artist, Jan Cornelisz
Vermeyen (1500-1559), to officially sketch important aspects of the campaign. Around 1548,
the most prominent weaver in Brussels, Willem de Pannemaker (1512-1581), was selected to
turn Vermeyen’s sketches into an elaborate tapestry series known as the Conquest of
Tunis. 168 The series highlighted Charles’s role as defender of the Christian faith, and this was
made clear in the second tapestry in which Christ is depicted as the true commander of the
expedition, and in the eleventh which shows the Emperor as a victorious crusader.
The second tapestry is a portrait of the muster in Barcelona (Fig. 11), and in the
middle ground there stands a knight holding onto a large banner portraying the Apocalyptic
Woman (Fig. 12). The banner is somewhat unique because instead of featuring a crucified
Jesus, the image is of Mary holding the Christ child “clothed in the sun with the moon at her
feet, with part of the cross of St. Andrew also showing against the red ground.” 169 This
designated Christ as the commander of the expedition while also stressing Charles’s role in
defending Christendom. The eleventh tapestry specifically illustrated Charles in the role of
the Christian knight. Here, Charles is modestly depicted in the middle of the image as a

167

Richardson, Renaissance Monarchy, 16-19.
Hendrik J. Horn, Jan Cornelisz Vermeyen, Painter of Charles V and His Conquest of Tunis:
Paintings, Etchings, Drawings, Cartoons & Tapestries (Doornspijk, the Netherlands: Davaco Publishers, 1989),
125.
169
Ibid., 184.
168

67
triumphant crusader, and he is flanked by loyal knights carrying the standard of the crucified
Christ as Moors kneel before him (Fig. 13). 170 While Charles’s enterprise was mainly
undertaken to secure his holdings in the western Mediterranean, he and his advisers
understood the value in portraying it as a crusade aimed at the Muslim infidel.

Figure 11. Jan Cornelisz Vermeyen, The Muster in Barcelona, ca. 1549-1551. Found in Hendrik J.
Horn, Jan Cornelisz Vermeyen, Painter of Charles V and His Conquest of Tunis: Paintings, Etchings,
Drawings, Cartoons & Tapestries (Doornspijk, the Netherlands: Davaco Publishers, 1989) B45.
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Figure 12. Jan Cornelisz Vermeyen, detail of banner portraying the Apocalyptic Woman in The Muster of
Barcelona, ca. 1549-1551. Found in Hendrik J. Horn, Jan Cornelisz Vermeyen, Painter of Charles V and
His Conquest of Tunis: Paintings, Etchings, Drawings, Cartoons & Tapestries (Doornspijk, the
Netherlands: Davaco Publishers, 1989) B46.
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Figure 13. Jan Cornelisz Vermeyen, The March to Rada, ca. 1549-1551. Found in Hendrik J. Horn, Jan Cornelisz
Vermeyen, Painter of Charles V and His Conquest of Tunis: Paintings, Etchings, Drawings, Cartoons & Tapestries
(Doornspijk, the Netherlands: Davaco Publishers, 1989) B87.

Despite Charles revealing that the safety of his hereditary possessions in the
Mediterranean were of more importance to him than those in eastern Europe, he also realized
that the Ottomans were more of a threat to the safety of Christendom in the Mediterranean.
Süleyman tried to siege Vienna twice, and was unable because of the distance from Istanbul,
bad weather, and lack of supplies, whereas in the Mediterranean, Barbarossa was located
much closer to Europe and dominated the seas. The Sultan and the Emperor both recognized
that the Mediterranean was a more lucrative and substantial area to control, and both sought
to exert their power there. The years 1520 to 1536 witnessed the most interaction between
Charles and Süleyman, and this was further instigated by their imperial minded advisers
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Gattinara and İbrahim Paşa. During their tenure, these men thoroughly influenced their
masters by impressing upon them that they were meant for global domination. Although
Charles never took too seriously the inflated imperial rhetoric and ideals that Gattinara
posited, it appears that Süleyman was much more receptive to İbrahim’s ideas of universal
sovereignty. While Charles and Süleyman continued to present themselves as the defenders
of their faiths until the ends of their reigns, the emphasis on universal sovereignty died with
Gattinara and İbrahim.
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Chapter 3: Religion and Heretics
At the beginning of the early modern period, Europe was still very much medieval
and kings like Charles had to share their power with the institutions and nobles of each
kingdom. In the Germanies, the Kingdoms of Castile and Aragon, and the Netherlands,
Charles was bound by constitutional restraints. As a monarch Charles had significant control
and privileges over his subjects, but as the Holy Roman Emperor he practically had no
authority in the Germanies and was merely a figurehead. In reality, the various German
princes held the true power according to Luther in a letter to a pastor in Cotbus in February
1539, “the Emperor is not a monarch and cannot depose the electoral princes nor alter the
form of the Empire.” 171 For Luther and his adherents, Charles shared his power with the
German princes and this diluted his sovereignty. In contrast, Süleyman was a true emperor in
every sense of the word. Due to the role of the Ottoman sultan and the make-up of the
government, Süleyman wielded an absolute authority that did not appear in Europe until the
seventeenth century. Süleyman was the undisputed head of government, so as the sultan it
was he who appointed government and religious officials. The Hapsburg ambassador, Ogier
Ghiselin de Busbecq (1522-92), stayed in Istanbul during the later years of Süleyman’s reign
and his letters give a compelling insight into the Ottoman Empire at this time. In his first
letter, Busbecq noted how “the Sultan himself” assigned positions and offices to “men
capable of performing them.” 172 Therefore, unlike Charles, Süleyman could appoint and
remove his own government officials and religious leaders (sheikhu’l-islam) as he saw fit
without fear of consequence from his subjects.
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In Europe, Charles faced opposition on many fronts. Not only did he have to compete
with other monarchs like Francis I, but he also had to deal with the German princes whose
autonomy was growing due to the spread of Lutheranism which encouraged practices that
undermined his authority. While Luther mainly preoccupied himself with reforming the
Roman Catholic Church, many German princes and electors began to resist the emperor. The
religious schism between Luther and the Catholic Church encouraged debate on European
political and religious ideologies, and as many German princes converted to Lutheranism
they began to oppose Charles’s reign and question his sovereignty. The German prince Philip
I, Landgrave of Hesse, argued that in the Holy Roman Empire the emperor was limited by
fundamental law and shared his control with the German princes. 173 As Holy Roman
Emperor, Charles was elected to his position by the princes and he did not have the right to
depose them, whereas Süleyman was the true emperor of his lands and had absolute
authority.
In the beginning of Charles’s and Süleyman’s reigns a lot of their focus was on each
other and combatting one another’s claims to universal sovereignty. Both rulers were able to
prove themselves militarily in battles against the other’s religion, and due to this they
presented themselves as the defenders of their faiths against the infidels. While the Sultan
and the Emperor continued to fight on and off into the second half of their reigns, during a
long decade centered on the 1540s, they both turned their attention from fighting each other
to combatting heretics. For Süleyman the heretical Safavid Shi’a and their leader in Iran
posed more of a threat to his empire and legitimacy as a Muslim ruler than did the Holy
Roman Emperor and the Christians. While the Ottoman Sultan and his advisers considered
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the Safavids to be worse than the Christians, the same cannot be said for the latter. Even
though Charles regarded the Lutherans in Germany as heretics and wanted to bring them
back into the fold of the Catholic Church, he often gave them concessions for military aide.
For Charles, defending his patrimony against Francis and Süleyman was the main priority,
and the Germans were vital as manpower for the Emperor’s military campaigns against the
French and Ottomans. It was when Francis and Süleyman no longer posed a direct threat to
Charles that he turned his attention to the Lutheran problem in the Germanies.
Throughout Süleyman’s time as sultan he conducted three campaigns against Shah
Tahmasp and the Safavids in Iran. The first invasion began in 1534 and lasted until the
following year, and due to this Charles was able to conduct his campaign to Tunis in 1535.
The second phase lasted two years from 1546-48, and the third in 1554 ended with a formal
peace, the Amasya Treaty in May 1555. The Safavids originated from within the Ottoman
Empire during Bayezid II’s sultanate, and posed a much larger danger than that of
Christianity. In Busbecq's Third Letter he related a conversation between himself and Grand
Vizier Rüstem:
I must now repeat another conversation which I had with Roostem, which will show
you what a wide difference of religion exists between the Turks and Persians.
[Rüstem] asked me once whether war was still going on between the Kings of Spain
and France. When I replied in the affirmative, he said, 'What right have they to wage
war against one another, when they are bound by religious ties?' 'The same right,' I
replied, 'as you have to go to war with the Persians; there are cities, provinces, and
kingdoms, about which they are at quarrel and have recourse to arms.' 'The cases are
not parallel,' replied Roostem, ‘I assure you that we abhor the Persians and regard
them as more unholy than we regard you Christians.' 174
While the European Christians tended to regard the Muslims as worse than heretics, the
Ottomans considered the Safavid Shi’a to be worse than Christians since they were more
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likely to rebel and cause chaos within the Ottoman Empire. During this time it was also much
more likely that a subject within the Ottoman realms would convert to Shi’ism and support
the Safavids than convert to Christianity. Not only were the Safavids located closer to the
heart of the Ottoman Empire, but they also posed a religious and political threat to the
legitimacy of the Ottoman Sultan. Therefore, in opposition to the Safavids, especially during
the second half of Süleyman’s reign, propaganda portrayed them as heretics and enemies of
true Sunni Islam and created a counter image of the Ottoman Sultan as the defender of the
orthodox Islamic faith. 175
Unlike Charles and his rocky relationship with the Pope, Süleyman and his
designated religious leader worked in tandem to legitimize and exert Süleyman’s secular and
religious claims. The religious leader of the Sunni Ottomans was known as the mufti of
Istanbul, a position which the sultan appointed and emerged from obscurity in the fifteenth
century. By Süleyman’s reign the mufti became the supreme office in the Ottoman judicial
hierarchy. In later centuries it also came to be known as the sheikhu’l-islam, and his chief
function was to issue fatwas in response to questions from the sultan, ministers, governors,
etc. Although his opinions did not have executive authority, before undertaking anything
controversial the sultan would seek a fatwa from the sheikhu’l-islam to legitimize his actions.
Süleyman had a close relationship with the two men who served in this position,
Kemalpaşazade (1526-35) and Ebu’s-su’ud (1545-74), and they played significant roles in
helping legitimize Süleyman’s wars against the Safavids and in presenting him as the
orthodox defender of Sunni Islam. 176
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According to the Quran and Islamic jurists, war against the Christian infidels was
perceived as just; however, it was trickier for the Ottoman sultan to justify battles against
fellow Muslims. Due to this the sheikhu’l-islam played an important role in helping to justify
Süleyman’s campaigns against the Safavids. In an Arabic treatise Kemalpaşazade, who held
the office of sheikhu’l-islam from 1526 to 1535, described the Safavids as having “the
outward form of Muslims, but the inward nature of infidels.” 177 He continued by noting that
“they claim that what the shah makes licit is licit, and what the shah makes forbidden is
forbidden. If the shah makes wine licit, then it is licit. In short, the varieties of their unbelief,
transmitted to us through what is common knowledge, cannot be numbered…We have no
doubt about their unbelief and apostasy…” 178 Although much of what Kemalpaşazade said
about the Safavids in this text is largely imagined, it not only reveals the grievances that the
Ottomans had but also demonstrates how Süleyman and his advisers sought to present the
Safavid Shah and his followers as rebels and bad Muslims in comparison to the devout
Ottomans. By listing the multiple heresies of the Safavids and designating them as infidels,
Kemalpaşazade was able to contend in regard to a question on the legality of war that it
would be considered “a major gaza.” 179 This justification was continued by Kemalpaşazade’s
successor Ebu’s-su’ud who also presented Süleyman as the bastion of orthodox Islam and in
a fatwa he too designated battle against the Safavids as holy war:
Is it licit according to the shari’a to fight the followers of the Safavids? Is the person
who kills them a holy warrior, and the person who dies at their hands a martyr?
Answer: Yes, it is a great holy war and glorious martyrdom.
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Another question: Assuming that it is licit to fight them, is this simply because of
their rebellion and enmity against the [Ottoman] Sultan of the People of Islam,
because they drew the sword against the troops of Islam, or what?
Answer: They are both rebels, and from many points of view, infidels. 180
Ebu’s-su’ud declared that the Safavids and their followers were infidels, an opinion that
made war not only licit but obligatory. However, while Kemalpaşazade was instrumental in
helping Süleyman religiously legitimize his wars, it was Ebu’s-su’ud who formulated
Süleyman’s claims to spiritual and imperial dominion. 181
From 1545 until his death in 1574, Ebu’s-su’ud played a central role in helping the
Ottoman sultan justify and exert his spiritual and secular claims. It was he as sheikhu’l-islam
who portrayed hostilities against the Safavids as holy war, and created the titles which
ultimately expressed Süleyman’s religious and political sovereignty. Although the Ottoman
sultans began to use the title of caliph as early as 1421 with Mehmed I, it was Ebu’s-su’ud
who invoked the theory of the Caliphate and bestowed this title on the Ottoman Sultan. 182
Originally for Sunni theologians, the concept of the ‘Caliphate’ came from the need to
counter the claims of the Shi’a and other heretical groups. Sunni Muslims believed in the
idea of the caliphate which asserted the legitimacy of the first three of the Four Rightly
Guided Caliphs (‘Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, ‘Uthman, and ‘Ali), whereas the Shi’a completely
disregarded the first three caliphs and believed that the Prophet designated his son-in-law
‘Ali to be his immediate successor. Since the Shi’a did not recognize the first three Rightly
Guided Caliphs, the theory of the caliphate was created to defend Sunni dogma and the
legitimacy of Sunni rule against heretics. 183 As a religious jurist, Ebu’s-su’ud inherited these
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traditional concepts of the position of the caliphate and adapted them for the Ottoman sultan
as a means to enhance his authority and to assert his primacy over other Islamic rulers. 184 At
this time, to describe Süleyman as the caliph had an ideological function of justifying his
secular rule in Islamic terms, and had the actual result of enhancing his powers. 185
By presenting Süleyman as the caliph, the Ottoman sultan served as the supreme head
of the Islamic community against the infidels and heretics. Taking this title also implied that
the sultan had claim to an authority over the interpretation and implementation of the shari’a.
Therefore in the Law-Book of Buda of 1541, Ebu’s-su’ud claimed that Süleyman was the
one “who makes smooth the path for the precepts of the manifest shari’a” and also “makes
manifest the Exalted Word [of God].” 186 In stating this, Ebu’s-su’ud emphasized the idea that
not only had Süleyman been divinely appointed by God, but it was his duty as sultan to
interpret and execute God’s law on earth. To further add legitimacy to the claim that
Süleyman was chosen by God, Ebu’s-su’ud declared in the dedication preface to his
commentary on the Quran that the Ottoman Sultan was the person who “God Most High has
bestowed the Caliphate of the Earth.” 187 According to Ebu’s-su’ud it was God who
designated the Ottoman dynasty with the caliphate in direct succession with the Rightly
Guided Caliphs, and this assertion helped to give Süleyman religious legitimacy and
dominance over other Muslim rulers like the Safavid Shah of Iran.
The Süleymaniye mosque is a perfect example of the physical embodiment of
Süleyman’s claim to sovereignty over Muslims and Christians, and it was Ebu’s-su’ud who
most successfully formulated this assertion in the inscription over the portal of the mosque.
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In 1547, the Sultan concluded a treaty with Emperor Charles and his brother Ferdinand, in
which they agreed to pay tribute for the lands they continued to hold in Hungary, and it
appears that immediately after this Süleyman laid the plan for the mosque which was finished
in 1557. 188 He commissioned Ebu’s-su’ud to write the inscription, and in doing so the
sheikhu’l-islam attempted to assert and legitimize Süleyman’s power and authority through
titles:
[Sultan Süleyman] has drawn near to [God], the Lord of Majesty and Omnipotence,/
the Creator of the World of Dominion and Sovereignty,/ [Sultan Süleyman] who is
His slave, made mighty with Divine Power,/ the Caliph, resplendent with Divine
Glory,/ Who performs the Command of the Hidden Book/ and executes its Decrees in
[all] regions of the inhabited quarter./ Conqueror of the Lands of the Orient and the
Occident/ with the Help of Almighty God and His Victorious Army,/ Possessor of the
Kingdoms of the World, Shadow of God over all Peoples, Sultan of the Sultans of the
Arabs and the Persians,/ Promulgator of Sultanic Qanuns,/ Tenth of the Ottoman
Khaqans,/ Sultan son of the Sultan, Sultan Süleyman Khan/…/ May the line of his
Sultanate endure until the End of the Line of the Ages!/… 189
Since Ebu’s-su’ud was restricted by space, he chose only the most important titles and
utilized this inscription to emphasize that Süleyman was ruler by both secular and divine
right. Süleyman’s position as the Ottoman sultan was an equal mixture of religious and
secular power and authority, whereas Charles’s position as Holy Roman Emperor was
becoming more and more secularized.
Even though Charles and his advisers, like Gattinara, asserted that he was chosen by
God to serve as king and Holy Roman Emperor, his role was far more secular than religious.
In Catholic Christendom the Pope was the religious leader of the Church and its members,
and the Holy Roman Emperor served as the secular extension of the papacy. While there had
always been a religious connotation to the position of the Holy Roman Emperor it was
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increasingly becoming more secularized during the sixteenth century especially due to the
spread of Lutheranism in the Germanies. While men like Luther supported Charles in his
position as Holy Roman Emperor, they emphasized that his role was secular and not
religious. In 1523, Luther published his tract Temporal Authority: To What Extent it should
be Obeyed after Charles commanded him to recant his beliefs and works at the Diet of
Worms in 1521. In order to explain the nature of temporal authority and its limitations,
Luther claimed that “God has ordained two governments: the spiritual, by which the Holy
Spirit produces Christians and righteous people under Christ; and the temporal, which
restrains the un-Christian and wicked so that—no thanks to them—they are obliged to keep
still and to maintain an outward peace.” 190 Charles’s position as Emperor did not coincide
with religion and was purely secular, as a temporal authority the Emperor’s job was to “bring
about external peace and prevent evil deeds” not to “produce righteousness.” 191 According to
Luther, since Charles was only a temporal prince he did not have the right to condemn the
Lutheran movement, and urged his followers to resist the Emperor.
If your prince or temporal ruler commands you to side with the pope, to believe thus
and so, or to get rid of certain books, you should say, “It is not fitting that Lucifer
should sit at the side of God. Gracious sir, I owe you obedience in body and property;
command me within the limits of your authority on earth, and I will obey. But if you
command me to believe or to get rid of certain books, I will not obey; for then you are
a tyrant and overreach yourself, commanding where you have neither the right not
authority,” etc. 192
Luther was able to publish texts like this because Charles did not have any real power
in the Germanies, and the Emperor could do nothing to stop him and Luther’s support from
various German princes. Although Charles’s propagandists presented him as the paladin of
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Christendom and as a sovereign with universal power, as the Holy Roman Emperor he was
merely a figurehead who exerted no control, and Luther and the spread of Protestantism was
a perfect example of this. Even though Luther did not believe that Charles should wage a
spiritual war against the Turks, in Vom Kriege he noted that the Emperor’s role as a temporal
and secular ruler meant that “if there is to be war against the Turk, it should be fought at the
emperor’s command, under his banner, and in his name. Then everyone can be sure in his
conscience that he is obeying the ordinance of God, since we know that the emperor is our
true overlord and head and that whoever obeys him in such a case obeys God also, whereas
he who disobeys him also disobeys God.” 193 Even though Luther had qualms about Charles’s
role as emperor, he ultimately supported him as a temporal authority, because for Luther the
Pope was the real enemy, not Charles.
For Catholics the true leader of Christendom was the Pope, and the Holy Roman
Emperor was his secular counterpart. During the sixteenth century the ambitions of the popes
reached an apogee with men like Julius II and Clement VII, who were more like medieval
princes than clergymen, and because of this they played a large role in the politics of early
modern Europe. While Charles came into conflict with various popes who filled the position
throughout his reign, his main problem was with Pope Clement VII (1523-34). Clement
hailed from the powerful de' Medici family of Florence, and his underlying motive of
enlarging the power of his family often brought him into conflict with the emperor. In theory,
the relationship between the pope and the emperor was meant to be symbiotic and both were
supposed to work together for the good of Christendom. In reality, Charles’s territorial
hegemony and secular power threatened that of Clement, so he often sought to
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counterbalance Charles by supporting Francis. However, whenever the tides turned against
the monarch he was allied with, he was quick to change to the side that better aided his
political power.
Clement’s indecisive political moves led to a crisis in 1527 with the Sack of Rome
(Fig. 14). Charles’s armies had not been paid for several months and grew rebellious, and on
May 6, 1527 a group of Spanish Catholics and Lutherans ransacked Rome. According to
Guicciardini in The History, “as soon as they entered the city, the imperials began to run
about tumultuously in search of booty, respecting neither friends nor the authority and
dignity of prelates, nor even churches, monasteries, and relics, honored by pilgrims from all
over the world, nor sacred things.” 194 The pope expected his ally Francis to send troops to
protect the Vatican, but he too was in debt and unable to help. The pope surrendered soon
after the armies arrived and was a prisoner until December 1527. In turn, Clement made a
deal with Charles in which “the Pontiff was to pay 400,000 ducats to the army” for his life
and surrendered a few cities to the emperor. 195 Militarily the pope’s army and guards were
not strong enough to fight off the attack from the north, so even though the pope did have
military power, his was not as powerful as that of the emperors. The papacy was reliant on
the monarchs for additional power and safety, without the support of a monarch even the
pope was in danger. Charles, however, also depended on the pope to legitimize his
sovereignty through the Church. Although Charles was elected emperor in 1519, it was not
until 1530 during the joint procession with Pope Clement VII, that Charles was
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acknowledged as Holy Roman Emperor. In spite of the nasty relations between Charles and
Clement VII, both acknowledged the interdependency of their positions.

Figure 14. Simonzio Lupi, Clement VII imprisoned in Castel Sant'Angelo treating for release, 1527, c. 1556 - c.
1575. Miniature in colors and gold, 200 x 290 mm. The British Library, London (f. 8). From: The British Library
Online, http://www.bl.uk/catalogues/illuminatedmanuscripts/ILLUMIN.ASP?Size=mid&IllID=18196

A miniature of a scene from the illuminated manuscript Triumphs of Emperor Charles V: Clement VII
imprisoned in Castel Sant'Angelo treating for release, 1527.

While the relationship between Süleyman and his sheikhu’l-islam was also
interdependent, the Ottoman religious leader did not pose a threat to Süleyman’s autonomy
and served as an extension of the sultan’s divine authority. Men like Ebu’s-su’ud were put in
their positions in order to help legitimize Süleyman as a secular and religious ruler, and were
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there to serve the sultan. Unlike the pope who wielded a significant amount of political
power and was ultimately concerned with his own interests, the role of the sheikhu’l-islam
was to aide the sultan since it was he who was the supreme head of the entire Ottoman
Empire. The Holy Roman Emperor, on the other hand, was merely a prestigious title and as a
sovereign could barely exert his control in the Holy Roman Empire. Even until the end of
Charles’s reign he and his followers utilized propaganda and rhetoric to portray him as a
conquering ruler who’s power knew no bounds when in reality he never truly dominated any
of his opponents, and as emperor he was merely a figurehead. Most of Charles’s most
important military successes that contributed to his glory as a monarch were in fact the result
of men like Duke Charles III of Bourbon and the Genoese Admiral Andrea Doria. Even
though Charles and his armies defeated Francis at the Battle of Pavia, recaptured Tunis at the
expense of Süleyman, and beat the Lutherans at the Battle of Muhlberg, these victories did
not shift the balance of power nor did they curb the ambitions of his enemies.
Despite Charles’s triumphs, not having any decisive outcome in the struggles with the
French, Ottomans, and Protestants and the fact that he abdicated a defeated man, his reign
was presented as triumphant and his victories were lauded. In 1556, the same year that
Charles abdicated, the Flemish printer Hieronymus Cock published a commemorative set of
engravings by Dirk Volkertsz Coornhert in honor of Charles V and his various victories. The
most impressive of the plates is an image of Charles amidst his vanquished adversaries:
Süleyman, Pope Clement VII, Francis I, the dukes of Cleves and Sacony, and the landgrave
of Hesse (Fig. 15). In this image, the Emperor sits atop an eagle between two pillars while
holding a sword and orb flanked by his six tethered foes. This was an ironic piece of
propaganda for the tired and dejected Emperor, considering he never truly conquered the
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French King, much less the Ottoman Sultan. Charles and his propagandists had to work
within the realm of theory when it came to the portrayal of the emperor’s power and
authority, since there were too many factors that actually limited him as a monarch.
The way that the government of the Holy Roman Empire was set up limited Charles’s
ability to exercise any type of control, thus making him more of a European figurehead than
anything else. Even though he and his advisers emphasized the fact that he was a secular and
religious leader, he had no true authority in the realm of religion and had to share his position
with the pope. In contrast, due to the setup of the Ottoman Empire, Süleyman was a true
emperor and Islamic sovereign. While the role of the sultan had always been intertwined with
religion, it was especially during Süleyman’s reign that this was capitalized on and
emphasized. Unlike the emperor and the pope, the Ottoman ruler and his sheikhu’l-islam
worked in tandem to not only legitimize the sultan’s role as political and religious leader but
also to bring the position prestige.
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Figure 15. Dirk Volkertsz Coornhert, The Victories of Emperor Charles V, 1555. Engraving, 153 x 228 mm.
The British Museum, London. From: The British Museum Online,
http://www.britishmuseum.org/research/collection_online/collection_object_details.aspx?objectId=1527563&p
artId=1

Emperor Charles V sits amongst his conquered adversaries. Here he sits on an eagle and is flanked by
six tethered foes.
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Conclusion
A tired and overwhelmed Charles officially abdicated his position as Holy Roman
Emperor in September 1556 to his brother Ferdinand. In 1554, Charles began to renounce his
various thrones, beginning with Sicily and Naples, then the Netherlands in 1555 in favor of
his son Philip II. Two years later, Charles further endowed Philip with the Kingdoms of
Aragon and Castile and its New World possessions. Charles’s decision to bestow upon the
heavily Catholic Philip Spain and the Protestant Netherlands helped determine the
tumultuous history of these two territories in the rest of the early modern period. Similar to
the Germanies for Charles, the Netherlands became a major point of conflict for Philip and
eventually led to their independence. Throughout Charles’s reign as Holy Roman Emperor
and King of Spain, he was much more successful and respected as the sovereign of Castile
and Aragon than as the figurehead of the Holy Roman Empire. Even though the title of
emperor held a certain amount of prestige throughout Europe, as the ruler of Spain Charles
held more power and authority than he did in the Germanies. The Lutheran heresy that began
at the start of Charles’s reign was his ultimate undoing.
In combatting his enemies like the German princes, Francis I, and Süleyman, Charles
really only won one significant battle against each of them that resounded to his honor and
glory. The rest of his campaigns against his foes were not very successful and did not have
any outstanding or long term outcomes. The Emperor’s recapture of Tunis in 1535 was
overturned by the Ottomans in 1574, and his triumph at the Battle of Mühlberg in 1547 had
no decisive effect on stopping the spread of Protestantism in the Germanies. By the time
Charles abdicated, not only was he sick, but he realized and readily understood his failures,
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therefore he decided to exit the scene completely and retired to a monastery in Yuste, Spain
where he died in September 1558.
While Charles had some successes throughout his time as a monarch, he ended his
life in defeat that he acknowledged. Upon his abdication from the emperorship he noted in
his speech that:
I had no inordinate ambition to rule a multitude of kingdoms, but merely sought to
secure the welfare of Germany, to provide for the defence of Flanders, to consecrate
my forces to the safety of Christianity against the Turk and to labor for the extension
of the Christian religion. But although such zeal was mine, I was unable to show so
much of it as I might have wished, on account of the troubles raised by the heresies of
Luther and the other innovators of Germany and on account of serious war into which
the hostility and envy of neighboring princes had driven me, and from which I have
safely emerged, thanks to the favor of God…. In order that I might not be wanting in
my duty I risked my strength, my goods, my repose, and my life for the safety of
Christianity and the defence of my subjects…. 196
This was a perfect summary of his goals and failures, and although he never fully adhered to
Gattinara’s notions of universal sovereignty, as a young ruler he had been much more
optimistic about his abilities to unite Christendom and stop his enemies. Immediately, at a
young age, his advisers and propagandists professed that he was destined to be the “Last
World Emperor” with the power to restore peace and usher in the end of times. This belief
was built more on the fact that Charles had inherited an unprecedented amount of land than
on his actual capabilities as a sovereign. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, the
makeup of Europe was still very much feudal and medieval which further inhibited Charles’s
authority. In the realm of theory, Charles was a glorious and victorious emperor whose power
knew no bounds, but in reality he was bound by various constitutional restraints and was not
as successful as his propaganda presented him to be.
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Süleyman, on the other hand, proved to be a truly successful ruler and actually lived
up to his purported potential. Indeed, there were times that Ottoman propaganda exaggerated
the Sultan’s victories such as his two sieges of Vienna. Despite the fact that the second siege
of Vienna was not a definitive triumph for Süleyman, it was presented as a glorious win to
the subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Although this may not have been an actual military
victory for Süleyman, he was extremely successful in advertising his universal sovereignty to
Europe. Süleyman actually believed in his ability to be a universal sovereign on a global
scale, and his military conquests in the west and east made it appear at the time as though it
was possible. Süleyman added many new territories to his empire during his time as sultan,
since he not only had the military prowess but also power to back up his claims, whereas
Charles did not and his campaigns were undertaken to defend his patrimony. While Charles
retired from his position as ruler and died shortly after, Süleyman continued to govern the
empire and conduct military campaigns up until his death. A seventy-one year old Süleyman
died September 6, 1566 in command of an expedition to Hungary, in which the Ottomans
were triumphant at the Battle of Szigetvár. For centuries, the role of the Ottoman sultan
revolved around being a ruler and an able military commander, unlike that of the Holy
Roman Emperor which had devolved to an honorary political position.
Süleyman was able to wield political and religious authority based on the makeup of
the Ottoman government and its relationship with Islam. Even though the Ottoman sultans
utilized Islam to religiously legitimize their rule since the beginning on the frontier, it was
Selim’s conquest of the Mamluk Empire that gave the Ottoman sultan true religious authority
over other Muslims. Selim’s takeover of Mecca and Medina made the Ottoman ruler the
premier Muslim authority, and further justified his wars against other Muslims like the
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Safavids. These victories in the east paved the way for Süleyman to become the greatest and
most powerful ruler of the early modern period. While it was Selim who helped the Ottoman
Empire transition from a peripheral state into the head of the Islamic community, it was
Süleyman who truly capitalized on these developments.
The European perception of the Turk began to harden during Selim’s reign as a result
of his rapid military victories. Though Selim never turned his attention to the west during his
time as sultan, he inspired a fear that had not been witnessed since Mehmed II conquered
Constantinople. Throughout all of Europe in the later Middle Ages and early modern period,
the Christians were well aware of the Ottoman’s impressive victories and the brutalities they
incurred, and this further contributed to the negative rhetoric and perception of the Turk and
Muslim which had been developing for centuries. The Ottoman Turks were unlike any
previous Muslim foe, because almost from the beginning since 1352 they had been involved
in European affairs and encroaching upon Christian territory. The first half of the sixteenth
century was vital in the evolution of the European perception of the Turk due to Selim and
his successor. While Christendom was initially led to believe that Süleyman was a prince of
peace, his swift conquests in the beginning of his reign made him and his army the terror and
scourge of Europe, especially for the Germans.
Since Süleyman’s victories in Hungary in 1521 and 1526 brought him dangerously
close to the Holy Roman Empire, the negative rhetoric of the Turk specifically flourished in
the Germanies as evidenced by the numerous Turkenbüchlein that were published during his
reign. According to the Germans, Süleyman was determined to bring them under his control,
and his two sieges of Vienna made it appear as though that was what he intended to do.
Despite the problems between the Lutherans and Charles, their common enemy was the
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Turks not each other. Even though the Germans truly feared and despised the Ottomans and
their sultan, Süleyman played a significant but indirect role in the spread of Lutheranism in
the Germanies. Charles’s actions reveal that his main priorities were combatting the
ambitions of the French King and Ottoman Sultan, not the Lutheran heresy. The Spaniards
and the Germans made up most of the Emperor’s armies, and in order to maintain his
hereditary territories he needed them to fight for him. Therefore, whenever Charles needed
the Protestants help as manpower against Francis or Süleyman, he would give them
concessions and limit his restrictions on their faith and practices. However as Holy Roman
Emperor, Charles did not exert a religious authority like the Ottoman sultan, and it was not
within his power or control to stop the Lutherans in the Germanies.
Both Charles and Süleyman are perfect representations of their cultures, ideals, faiths,
and time. These men were archetypes of their age, and best represent the early modern
period’s unique ideals and customs. On the perceived global stage between Europe and the
Middle East, these two rulers went head to head as representatives of their respective regions
and religions. Although the Sultan and the Emperor devoted a lot of their manpower against
the other and spent much of their time counteracting the other’s ambitions, they never
actually came into physical contact and interacted in the realm of rhetoric and theory. While
Charles attempted to express his dominion over Europe and Süleyman through propaganda,
rhetoric, and iconography, he was not capable of exerting an absolute authority like that of
the Ottoman sultan. The rights and liberties of the various kingdoms that Charles inherited
and the Holy Roman Empire prohibited the ruler from exerting an absolute power like the
Ottoman sultan’s. The makeup of the Ottoman government and its marriage to Islam,
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especially during Süleyman’s reign, is what enabled him to be the most powerful ruler in
Europe and the Middle East.
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